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decision in Employment Division v. Smith, where the Court had broadly
held that the Free Exercise Clause did not entitle religious believers to
exemptions from generally applicable laws. Hosanna-Tabor could end up
an isolated anomaly, a peculiar concession to the importance of ministers
and the intrusiveness of employment discrimination laws, a railroad ticket
good for one day and train only. But the Court’s opinion speaks of a
broader principle, a principle whose boundaries it consciously puts off
defining. And it is striking how so many decisions in the lower courts fall
within Hosanna-Tabor’s principle. From employment discrimination law
to labor law, from contract to tort, lower courts regularly dismiss all
manner of cases in ways incompatible with Smith and for reasons akin to
those given in Hosanna-Tabor. This Article looks at that universe of cases,
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INTRODUCTION
Two terms ago, in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court returned to religious liberty, holding
that the First Amendment precludes ministers from bringing employment
discrimination claims against their churches.1 Hosanna-Tabor’s holding
was narrow, but its importance lies beyond its holding. Twenty years
earlier, in Employment Division v. Smith, 2 the Supreme Court held that the
Free Exercise Clause did not entitle religious believers to exemptions from
generally applicable laws. 3 Hosanna-Tabor distinguished Smith, claiming
that internal church matters were outside Smith’s reach. 4 The Court drew
this distinction from a string of early Supreme Court cases that had
required courts to abstain from fights over church property. HosannaTabor reaffirmed those cases and repeated their statements of principle, but
added little of its own in further explanation.
Meanwhile, a curious development continues in lower courts across
the country. All kinds of cases—from tort to contract, from labor law to
corporate law—continue to be dismissed on grounds of religious liberty,
despite Smith and for reasons somewhat akin to Hosanna-Tabor. Besides
the ministerial exception, the most well-known example is that courts will
not resolve claims of clergy malpractice. 5 But these are just the two most
salient and well-defined illustrations; ones less familiar and less tidy
abound. The Connecticut Supreme Court recently dismissed the negligence

1

132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3
Id. at 886 n.3 (“[G]enerally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a
particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest . . . .”).
4
See infra notes 56–70 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
2
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claims of a woman who fell during a Catholic charismatic healing service.6
The Texas Supreme Court recently dismissed a battery suit brought by a
seventeen-year-old who claimed she was hurt during a church exorcism.7
And whatever the principle here, it is not limited to tort. Courts have
dismissed claims that a rabbi was fired without good cause as his contract
required, 8 or that a parent violated his prenuptial agreement by bringing his
children to a Catholic Mass, 9 or that the Southern Baptist Convention failed
to follow its own rules when it confirmed its slate of national officers. 10
To be clear, these results are not all due to Hosanna-Tabor; most of
these cases were decided before Hosanna-Tabor. And the reasoning in
these cases rarely mirrors that of Hosanna-Tabor or its predecessor cases.
With some important exceptions, these lower court opinions tend to be
terse and unreflective—likely a product of state courts having too much on
their plates. Some decisions cite only governing state court decisions; some
cite little precedent at all. They certainly are not all consistent; indeed, their
inconsistencies are glaring. 11 But if the answer is that lower courts have
been somehow inadvertently and imprecisely stumbling toward HosannaTabor, then that seems downright fascinating.
The old model of the Free Exercise Clause involved disputes between
the government on one side and a religious believer (or group) on the other.
This is the classic paradigm of church and state taught in constitutional law
classes, and here Smith reigns. The new model involves disputes between
religious believers. These cases have always been around, and have always
posed more trouble for courts. Hosanna-Tabor unquestionably means that
the new model will be handled differently from the old one, but it leaves
the details wide open. This Article aims to offer a theory for these new
model cases, seeking to put more flesh on this idea of church autonomy.
Part I of this Article examines the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC and the
Court’s conception of church autonomy. Part II argues that the
implementation of this principle requires a somewhat imprecise distinction
6

See Kubala v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 43 A.3d 662, 662 (Conn. 2012).
See Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008).
8
See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654, 655 (2d Cir. 2009); see also infra
note 207 (listing additional cases).
9
See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1157–58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
10
See Crowder v. S. Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718, 726–27 (11th Cir. 1987).
11
See 2 WILLIAM W. BASSETT ET AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 10:1, at 10-8
(2013) (“[T]he case law [regarding] the civil liability of religious organizations is not entirely
consistent.”); Annotation, Liability of Churches or Other Religious Societies for Torts Causing
Personal Injury or Death, 124 A.L.R. 814–15 (1940) (“The authorities upon the subject in hand are far
from satisfactory and do not admit of the formulation of general rules.”); see also Richard W. Garnett,
Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 515, 526 (2007) (arguing that “the ‘church autonomy’ doctrine is more of a grab-bag of
precedents than a clear rule or prohibition”).
7
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between two kinds of legal obligations—imposed ones (like tort and
criminal law) and assumed ones (like contract or property). Part III
examines church autonomy in the former area, while Part IV examines
church autonomy in the latter.
I.

HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN
CHURCH & SCHOOL V. EEOC
Hosanna-Tabor began as a garden-variety dispute over the scope of
the ministerial exception. Cheryl Perich taught fourth grade at a small
religious school run by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church.12 She
was responsible for her students’ religious instruction, and she was also a
commissioned minister in the national church, the Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod. After an escalating disagreement over when she would
return from disability leave, the church removed Perich and she sued to get
her job back. The lower courts disagreed over whether Perich’s job duties
and ecclesiastical office were enough to put her within the ministerial
exception. 13 But in the Supreme Court, the dispute widened into whether
the ministerial exception should exist at all.
Two distinct lines of precedents converged in Hosanna-Tabor, with
each side claiming its own as controlling. The first set of cases involved
religious believers seeking exemptions from burdensome government
regulation. The Supreme Court used to give exemptions in sufficiently
sympathetic cases. 14 But in 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith, 15 the
Supreme Court held that courts should generally not give exemptions if the
law in question was neutral and generally applicable.16 The second line of
cases involved internal religious disputes—two factions fighting over
church property or a church officer disputing his removal. Here the Court’s
position had been firm: Churches resolved their own conflicts, and courts
did not interfere. Sometimes the prevailing law was generally applicable,
but the Court never cared and sometimes did not seem to notice. 17 Churches

12

For the facts that follow, see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,
132 S. Ct. 694, 699–701 (2012).
13
Compare EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (concluding that Perich was a minister and that her claims were barred), with EEOC
v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that
Perich was not a minister and that her claims were not barred).
14
The Court used to ask whether burdens on religious liberty had been justified by a compelling
governmental interest. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
15
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
16
Id. at 886 n.3 (“[G]enerally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a
particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest . . . .”).
17
The dissenters noticed more often. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 726 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the court for reversing the judgment of the
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had the right to choose their officers, regardless of the usual principles of
corporate or trust law. 18 In a church split, courts could not give the property
to the faction it believed closest to the church’s original beliefs, even if
such a method was used to resolve disputes in nonreligious organizations.19
Hosanna-Tabor fell into this second line of cases, in a sense. It, too,
was a fight about the removal of a church officer. But the vitality of the
second line of cases had been thrown into doubt by Smith. Smith had
flattened them into a single cryptic sentence about how the government
cannot get involved in “controversies over religious authority or dogma.” 20
The Solicitor General saw these cases as moribund anomalies, calling them
simply “older cases concerning church-property disputes,” 21 and dismissing
them in stray sentences and footnotes. 22 To employment lawyers, HosannaTabor involved an issue of great visceral importance, but little practical
importance. Ministers make up a tiny fraction of the labor market; most
employment law courses will probably not even cover Hosanna-Tabor. But
church-and-state scholars knew from the start that, no matter which way it
was decided, Hosanna-Tabor would remake the field.
Though the Court surely did not find this case easy, its opinion does
make it seem that way. Embedded within the second line of cases, the
Court sees a clear, coherent, and powerful principle: “‘[R]eligious
organizations [have] power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine.’” 23 Each has the “right to shape its own faith and mission through
its appointments” without “government involvement in such ecclesiastical
decisions.” 24 Churches choose their leaders; the government does not
interfere. And there is no hand-wringing about this, no discernible
hesitation. The part of the opinion establishing the ministerial exception
takes less than three pages. 25

state courts when those courts had decided the religious dispute “just as they would have attempted to
decide a similar dispute among the members of any other voluntary association”).
18
See id. (majority opinion) (barring the legal claims of a deposed bishop challenging his removal);
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (chaplain); cf. NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (parochial school teacher).
19
See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1969).
20
Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
21
Brief for the Federal Respondent at 11, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553).
22
See id. at 24–26 (distinguishing, in rapid succession, Milivojevich, Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, and
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)); id. at 25 n.5 (distinguishing Watson v. Jones,
8 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872)); id. at 26 n.6 (distinguishing Gonzalez); id. at 40 n.10 (distinguishing
Catholic Bishop).
23
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704 (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116).
24
Id. at 706.
25
This is Part II.C of the opinion. See id. at 705–07.
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The unanimity of the Court is also striking because the Justices are
often deeply divided on church-and-state matters. 26 The Court has been
unanimous only on basic propositions and extreme facts.27 Lower courts
universally accepted the ministerial exception, but it faced hostile reviews
in the legal academy, a chilly reception from liberal public interest groups,
and an open repudiation from the Solicitor General. 28 Had this case been
decided 5–4, it would have been seen as a partisan victory, as conservative
religious belief triumphing over liberal civil rights laws. But that narrative
does not fit the facts. Justice Ginsburg has spent a good part of her life
working to end discrimination; she joins the majority opinion with no
expressed reservation.
Yet sometimes the price of unanimity is clarity, and perhaps HosannaTabor illustrates that too. The Court is certain that there is a ministerial
exception, but it is far less certain on the line between ministers and nonministers—even though the latter, and not the former, was the issue that
had divided lower courts.29 On that latter issue, the Court’s opinion lays out
four criteria: “[T]he formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance
reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious
functions she performed for the Church.” 30 This is a classic balancing test,
focused partially on clerical office (the first three criteria) and partially on
job duties (the fourth). But the Court says little about each of these criteria,
and nothing about how to weigh them against each other.31 Most of the
guidance comes from the Court’s holding itself: wherever the boundary is,
Perich is inside it. 32 But the Court rejects a purely functional inquiry,
emphasizing the importance of Perich’s clerical office.33 And the Court
adds that the functional part of the inquiry cannot simply be a measure of

26
The Court’s recent decision on the constitutionality of the cross in the Mojave National Preserve
produced six opinions and little agreement. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
27
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993).
28
See Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 n.6
(2011) (discussing criticisms of the ministerial exception and providing citations); see also supra notes
21–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Solicitor General’s repudiation).
29
See Lund, supra note 28, at 3 n.3 (discussing the circuit split).
30
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708.
31
The Court does not say whether clerical office would be enough without the religious job duties,
and expressly declines to say whether the religious job duties would be enough without the clerical
office. Id. (“We express no view on whether someone with Perich’s duties would be covered by the
ministerial exception in the absence of the other considerations we have discussed.”).
32
Id. at 707 (“We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee
qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial
exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.”).
33
Id. at 709.

1188

108:1183 (2014)

Free Exercise Reconceived

time spent—once one has the requisite degree of religious duties, one is a
minister regardless of how many secular job duties one might also have. 34
Where this line ultimately gets drawn is obviously of great
importance. Before Hosanna-Tabor, one criticism of the ministerial
exception was that it was absolute, that it involved no balancing. 35 But it
would be more accurate to say that the balancing happens categorically
rather than case-by-case. Different balances between the governmental
interest and the religious interest get struck by drawing the line between
ministers and non-ministers in different places. This is another way in
which Hosanna-Tabor aligns better with Sherbert and Yoder 36 than with
Smith: it smacks of the old compelling interest test when the Court says that
the employment laws are “undoubtedly important” but still insufficient to
outweigh the religious interest.37
Maybe the Court deserves criticism for failing to provide any clear line
here, but the deeper problem is that there is simply no natural point of
differentiation between ministers and non-ministers. In the forty years
before Hosanna-Tabor, lower courts and commentators could not find it.38
Perhaps this will commit the Court to taking a long string of ministerial
exception cases. But the opposite result seems more likely. Without a way
to make things better, the Justices will not want to get involved in this
again. 39
On some issues, Hosanna-Tabor does give straightforward answers.
For one thing, the Court had never decided whether church autonomy was a
Free Exercise or Establishment Clause doctrine. 40 Hosanna-Tabor says that
34

Id.
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The “Absolute” Ministerial Exception, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 13, 2012,
8:59 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/01/absolute-ministerial-exception.html (“One of the curious
features of the Supreme Court’s version of the ministerial exception is that the rule is stated in absolute
terms that eschew all attempts at balancing.”).
36
See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing Sherbert and Yoder and the compelling
interest test they had established for free exercise).
37
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (“The interest of society in the enforcement of employment
discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in
choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.”).
38
Lower court and commentators often punted in precisely the same way as the Supreme Court did
in Hosanna-Tabor. See Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“We leave for another day the formulation of a general test because, under
any reasonable construction of the ministerial exception, Rosas meets the definition of a minister.”). I
offered my own thoughts on this issue in a piece published just before Hosanna-Tabor. See Lund, supra
note 28.
39
See, e.g., Packwood v. Senate Select Committee on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319, 1320–21 (1994)
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that certiorari is typically denied
in cases where a legal standard “cannot be reduced to formula,” because lower court decisions will tend
to involve “factbound determination[s]”).
40
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (Free Exercise Clause); Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (the First Amendment); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 638 & n.15 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (Establishment Clause); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
35
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it is both. 41 For a claim within the ministerial exception’s proper scope, a
church wins by invoking either the Free Exercise Clause or the
Establishment Clause. What ripple effects Hosanna-Tabor might cause in
the general jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause is profoundly
unclear. Yet the Establishment Clause holding does perhaps suggest an
important shift on the part of one particular Justice. For years, Justice
Thomas has battled against the modern Establishment Clause, arguing that
it applies only to the federal government and not the states. 42 But HosannaTabor dismisses both federal and state law claims, and dismissing state law
claims on Establishment Clause grounds necessarily implies incorporation
of the Establishment Clause. 43 It is not entirely clear that Justice Thomas
means to give up this fight, but hopefully Hosanna-Tabor will make it
harder for him to return to it. 44
Hosanna-Tabor also clarifies that the ministerial exception is an
affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar.45 Some attach great
importance to this issue, seeing it as raising a question specifically about
the meaning of the Religion Clauses. 46 But the Court has for years been
trying to rein in wildly expansive notions about what goes to subject matter
jurisdiction across doctrinal areas, and Hosanna-Tabor seems to be just
another example. 47 Of course, one likely consequence of the Court’s nonjurisdictional approach is that ultimately unsuccessful claims will continue

U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (the First Amendment); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449–50 (1969) (the First Amendment); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (Free Exercise Clause,
but also the separation of church and state).
41
132 S. Ct. at 702 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision
of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”); see also id. at 706 (reiterating the point).
42
See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726–31 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 677–80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
43
See 132 S. Ct. at 701 (noting that the suit claimed “unlawful retaliation under both the ADA and
the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act”).
44
See id. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) (endorsing a robust view of the ministerial exception).
For a persuasive attack on Justice Thomas’s view on incorporation, see Douglas Laycock, Theology
Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the
Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 241–43 (2004).
45
See 132 S. Ct. at 709 n.4.
46
Compare Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the
Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 43 (2008) (arguing that the ministerial exception is a defense based on subject matter
jurisdiction), with Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the
Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289 (2012) (arguing that the ministerial
exception is a merits-based defense); see also Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church
Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891 (2013).
47
A string of such cases are given in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers & Trainmen General, 558 U.S. 67, 81–82 (2009).
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further than they did before. Ministerial status is a fact-intensive question.48
Before Hosanna-Tabor, cases were disposed of on motions to dismiss. 49
Now summary judgment will probably be the norm. 50
Plaintiffs must have the right to prove their cases, of course, but this
still poses a problem. Churches have a constitutional right to choose their
ministers without governmental interference.51 Litigation is government
interference. Financially speaking, litigation that costs as much as a
damage judgment is just as harmful as a damage judgment. The ministerial
exception should be thought of not just as a defense to liability, but as a
right not to face litigation over the choice of one’s clergy. This would
suggest allowing churches to immediately appeal a conclusion that the
plaintiff is not a minister 52—akin to the interlocutory appeals allowed in the
contexts of officer immunity, double jeopardy, and state sovereign
immunity. 53 This approach has benefits, but it also has costs: it would
enable church defendants to prolong legitimate litigation, no matter how
obvious it is that the plaintiff is not a minister. Maybe a better approach
would be bifurcated discovery, with the court deciding the applicability of
the ministerial exception in advance of allowing discovery on other
issues. 54 This makes a great deal of sense: issues of ministerial status
naturally separate from questions of discrimination and retaliation, and the
facts surrounding ministerial status are less frequently disputed, more
quickly and easily ascertained, and more objectively proven.
48

One case, decided after Hosanna-Tabor, involved facts virtually identical to those of HosannaTabor: both parish-owned schools, both within the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, both elementary
school teachers, both commissioned ministers, both called positions. Of course, the case had to be
litigated to judgment. See Herzog v. St. Peter Lutheran Church, 884 F. Supp. 2d 668 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
49
See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting how “assertion of the
ministerial exception . . . is akin to a government official’s defense of qualified immunity, which is
often raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion”).
50
See Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 172 n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Given the
nature of the ministerial exception, we suspect that only in the rarest of circumstances would dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6)—in other words, based solely on the pleadings—be warranted.”).
51
“Governmental interference” is another phrase that runs throughout the Court’s opinion. See
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012)
(“[G]overnment interference with a church’s ability to select its own ministers . . . .”); id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (“[F]ree from state interference [with regard to] matters of church government
as well as those of faith and doctrine . . . .”); id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[F]reedom to
select the clergy . . . is part of the free exercise of religion protected by the First Amendment against
government interference . . . .”); id. at 707 (“The present case . . . concerns government interference
with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself . . . .”).
52
See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 870 (1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (noting that interlocutory appeals are necessary when the right includes an “entitlement
not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” because the right “would be effectively lost if a
case [were] erroneously permitted to go to trial” (alteration in original)).
53
See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305–07 (1996) (discussing these three examples).
54
For a general discussion of bifurcated discovery, see John P. Rowley III & Richard G. Moore,
Bifurcation of Civil Trials, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2010).
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All this minutiae is of consequence, but it is minutiae nonetheless. The
defining aspect of Hosanna-Tabor is in how it treats religion as distinctive.
In Smith, and in the earlier regulatory burden cases, the Court framed the
issue as whether religious believers should get an “exemption” from a
generally applicable law. Exemptions evoke the idea of special treatment,
which many equate with favoritism. The word “exemption” appears thirtyfive times in the Smith opinions. But it does not appear anywhere in
Hosanna-Tabor, in any of the opinions. (If it were not called the ministerial
exception, the word “exception” would not appear either.) The Court does
not ask whether churches should be exempt from employment
discrimination laws. Instead, the Court asks whether churches have the
right to choose their leaders. This is more than a clever rhetorical
flourish—it is a change in baseline. It does not matter how anyone else is
treated; religious groups have the right to choose their leaders. Churches do
not get reformed by the government, no matter what else the government
tries to reform. The Court begins by grounding this right in historical
tradition and case precedent, but it quickly retreats back to the
constitutional text: “[T]he text of the First Amendment itself . . . gives
special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”55
This sentence grows more awkward every time one reads it. The First
Amendment speaks of religion, not religious organizations. Religion is
what gets special solicitude. Religious organizations may also get special
solicitude, but that would come only as a derivative consequence.
The Court, of course, knows all this perfectly well. But it will not say
it, probably because it believes doing so would undermine Smith. Here the
Court should take its own awkwardness seriously: when a precedent
demands transparently false statements about constitutional text, it is time
to rethink the precedent. In any event, the Court recognizes the need to
distinguish Smith. Here is how the Court does so:
It is true that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon’s prohibition
on peyote use, is a valid and neutral law of general applicability. But a
church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote.
Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The
present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal
church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. 56

This distinction has already come under fire from critics of HosannaTabor. 57 Even fiercer attacks will eventually come from the other side, and
55

Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
Id. at 707.
57
See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Essay, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951, 955 (2012) (“[T]his distinction . . . is far from
self-evident.”); Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 993 (2013) (“That
distinction cannot hold water.”); Mark Strasser, Making the Anomalous Even More Anomalous: On
Hosanna-Tabor, the Ministerial Exception, and the Constitution, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 400, 444
56
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for an obvious reason. Smith scrapped the compelling interest test for Free
Exercise by a 5–4 vote; Hosanna-Tabor was 9–0. If one of the two must be
overruled, it will probably not be Hosanna-Tabor. There is no question
which is the fixed star.
But neither of them will be overruled any time soon. The immediate
question is how to best read them together. Some have said that HosannaTabor draws a line between individuals and institutions. Hosanna-Tabor
protects institutions; Smith refused to protect individuals.58 That is a good
first stab, but more is needed. Individuals have no right to use peyote under
Smith, but neither does the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church can fire
ministers for any reason under Hosanna-Tabor, but any individual who
hires a minister would have exactly the same right.59 Religious institutions
will benefit from Hosanna-Tabor. But the case is more about the nature of
religious association than the power of religious institutions.
Hosanna-Tabor distinguishes between “internal church decision[s]”
and “outward physical acts.” 60 “Internal” is the important word, appearing
at several crucial points in the opinion.61 But this “internal versus external”
distinction runs immediately into a difficulty. After establishing the
ministerial exception, the Court hints that churches selecting ministers
would probably have no immunity from the child labor laws or the
immigration laws.62 Such a conclusion seems instinctively right, and it is

(2012) (“[S]uch a distinction is unpersuasive . . . .”). For an even stronger criticism, see Michael C.
Dorf, Ministers and Peyote, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 12, 2012, 12:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/
01/ministers-and-peyote.html (“With due respect: huh???”).
58
See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 57, at 971 (“[T]he Supreme Court chose to tip the scales and protect
religious institutions instead of religious individuals . . . .”); Griffin, supra note 57, at 1016 (“Individual
religious believers are subject to the rule of Smith, while institutions are not.”). Even some of HosannaTabor’s defenders have phrased it this way. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on HosannaTabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 835–36 (2012) (“Hosanna-Tabor suggest[s] a shift in Religion
Clauses jurisprudence from a focus on individual believers to a focus on the autonomy of organized
religious institutions.”).
59
Federal employment discrimination laws only apply to entities with a certain number of
employees, but some state laws have no numerical thresholds in their laws. See Sandra F. Sperino,
Recreating Diversity in Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith,
44 HOUS. L. REV. 349, 355 n.20 (2007) (providing citations to state laws).
60
132 S. Ct. at 707.
61
E.g., id. at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[I]nternal discipline and government . . . .”);
id. at 706 (“[I]nternal governance of the church . . . .”); id. at 707 (“[I]nternal church decision . . . .”); id.
at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[M]atters of internal governance . . . .”). Before Hosanna-Tabor,
lower courts sometimes referred to the ministerial exception as part of a larger “internal affairs”
doctrine. See, e.g., Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.)
(arguing that the ministerial exception “is better termed the ‘ministers exception’ . . . [or] better still . . .
the ‘internal affairs’ doctrine”).
62
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (noting the church’s concession that the ministerial exception
would not “bar government enforcement of general laws restricting eligibility for employment,” such as
the laws forbidding the “hiring [of] children or aliens not authorized to work in the United States”).
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consistent with what courts were doing before Hosanna-Tabor. 63 But this
would seem to contradict what the Court said immediately before, because
hiring an illegal alien as one’s minister is an internal church decision, not
an outward physical act.
To make sense of this, we must turn to a later line in the opinion where
the Court remarks how “the [ministerial] exception applies only to suits by
or on behalf of ministers themselves.” 64 This is what seems to drive the
Court’s “internal versus external” idea. The church autonomy line of cases
grows out of a notion of implied consent.65 When one joins a church, one
accepts the religious choices made by the church. People can leave or stay.
But so long as they choose to stay, they accept how the church handles its
religious affairs. Dissenters cannot use the coercive force of the
government to compel a change in the church’s religious views, practices,
or governance. 66
The consent idea will be examined in more detail in the next Part, but
the immediate point is that it can reconcile Hosanna-Tabor’s principle with
its limits. Consent binds those who consent.67 And it binds those who bring
derivative claims. Consent here being of a constitutional nature, it bars the
government from acting on behalf of those who consent. But it does not bar
outsiders to the church, and it does not bar the government from acting on
behalf of those outsiders.
This has the power to conceptually resolve the point about illegal
aliens. 68 The government can prosecute a church for hiring an illegal alien
as a minister because such a suit is on behalf of the public at large rather
than any distressed church insider. This can also reconcile Smith. The
government can prosecute the Native American Church for using peyote in
63

In one case, Quakers challenged laws requiring them to verify the immigration status of their
employees. The Court held that the issue was not governed by the church autonomy cases, but by the
regulatory exemption cases. See Am. Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 951 F.2d 957, 959
(9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the church “simply argues that its religious principles compel conduct that
[the immigration law] makes unlawful” and “[t]hat fact does not bring AFSC within the rule of Catholic
Bishop”); see also Brock v. Wendell’s Woodwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
a church vocational program placing underage children with associated employers was barred by the
Fair Labor Standards Act).
64
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
65
E.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871) (“All who unite themselves to such a
body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.” (emphasis
added)).
66
See Lund, supra note 28, at 13 (summarizing the church autonomy cases this way).
67
This is a familiar principle in law. But to give an example, two people who agree to fight each
other cannot sue each other in tort, although the government can criminally prosecute them both. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892C cmt. b, illus. 3 (1979) (“A and B agree to fight a duel with
pistols. A fires at B and his bullet strikes and breaks B’s arm. A is not liable to B.”).
68
This does not explain Hosanna-Tabor’s point about children. The argument there would have to
be that children are somehow incapable of consent, or that the government interest in protecting
children is sufficiently compelling to outweigh church autonomy.
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its religious rituals. But a suit by a minister against the Native American
Church over the church’s peyote use—imagine, say, an emotional distress
claim brought by a disgruntled former minister, claiming bad spiritual
consequences from using the drug—probably falls within Hosanna-Tabor’s
sphere. Of course, this introduces a very slippery distinction. It will be
difficult to tell when exactly the government acts on behalf of insiders and
when it acts on behalf of outsiders.69 But this insider–outsider distinction
provides a good starting point. Suits of the form “government versus
church” will generally be within Smith’s domain. Suits of the form “insider
versus church” or “government on behalf of insider versus church” will be
within Hosanna-Tabor’s.
All this can make it seem like Hosanna-Tabor prefers churches over
their ministers. 70 But this is wrong, or at least it should be wrong. Suits of
the form “church versus insider” are just as barred as suits of the form
“insider versus church.” The ministerial exception is a form of
constitutionalized at-will employment; it enables both sides to leave the
relationship at any time, without legal reprisal. In our modern age,
employers now sue employees for things like breach of fiduciary duty and
unfair competition. The duty of loyalty allows employers to claw back
compensation when a jury finds that an employee has committed serious
misconduct.71 The ministerial exception should bar these claims too. Juries
do not decide whether ministers have done their jobs well or not. Ministers
and churches may disagree about who was responsible for the relationship
breakdown, but the government stays out of those disagreements.
Talk of constitutionalized at-will employment may remind some
readers of the Lochner era, when the Court experimented with
constitutionalized at-will employment with some bad results. 72 And indeed,
minimizing governmental influence in economic affairs now seems silly to
most people; we tend to write off Lochner and its companion decisions as
foolish misadventures. But minimizing governmental influence in religious
69
To the extent the Smith Court considered the harms of Native American peyote use, they focused
on the possibilities of diversion to those outside the Native American Church. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 904–06 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding this to be a compelling interest
justifying the burden on religion).
70
Both sides have seen it this way. See, e.g., Mark E. Chopko & Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold
Question: Refining the Ministerial Exception Post-Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 233, 244
(2012) (footnotes omitted) (“In the end, this article advocates for the proposition that a ‘minister’ may
not sue her ‘church’ in the ‘civil courts’ for claims ‘arising out of the terms and conditions of her
ministry.’”); Griffin, supra note 57, at 1010 (“The ministerial rule always favors employers.”).
71
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1958) (“An agent is entitled to no
compensation for conduct which is disobedient or which is a breach of his duty of loyalty . . . .”); see
also Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law, Contract
Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777 (discussing the duty of loyalty).
72
See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating a federal law protecting railroad
workers discharged for union activity as an unjustified imposition on the constitutional freedom to
contract); see also Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating a similar state law).
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affairs is not at all silly—that is the point of the First Amendment. “Laissez
faire” means “leave it be” in French. That may be poor economic theory
with no constitutional basis, as the Court eventually came to believe. 73 But
leaving people be is precisely the right approach for government to take
with regard to religion. The government does not practice religion; it does
not interfere with the private practice of religion; it leaves religion be. A
complex modern society like ours must impose limits on that principle out
of necessity, but that is the principle. Hosanna-Tabor could be thought of
as part of the state’s general laissez-faire attitude to the clergy. The state
does not hire or fire clergy; it does not get involved when churches hire or
fire them. The state does not pay clergy; it does not decide how much
churches should pay them. 74 The state does not license clergy; it does not
decree what qualifications churches can require. 75 All this the state leaves
alone.
More will be said about the justifications for church autonomy and the
scope of the church autonomy principle. The point of this Article is to work
those things out. Certainly Hosanna-Tabor does not try to do so. The Court
says explicitly that it only means to consider the employment
discrimination laws.76 Of course, any plausible reading of Hosanna-Tabor
includes more than that. No court would allow Cheryl Perich to repackage
her allegations into claims of negligence, defamation, or emotional
distress. 77 This is an inference, of course, but it seems a necessary one.
Hosanna-Tabor will not make any sense otherwise.
II. HOSANNA-TABOR, CHURCH AUTONOMY,
AND RELIGIOUS VOLUNTARISM
Hosanna-Tabor establishes a certain principle with an uncertain scope:
“[R]eligious organizations [have] power to decide for themselves, free

73
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”).
74
See, e.g., Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.)
(dismissing minimum-wage and overtime claims brought by ministers of the Salvation Army).
75
See, e.g., HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627 (Tex.
2007) (holding unconstitutional a statutory regime where seminaries had to obtain certificates of
authority or accreditation from the state).
76
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012)
(“We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by
employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There will be
time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they
arise.”).
77
Such claims were dismissed even before Hosanna-Tabor. See, e.g., Guerrier v. S. New Eng.
Conference Ass’n of Seventh-Day Adventists, Inc., No. CV085007824, 2009 WL 4282894 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2009) (dismissing not only discrimination claims, but also a variety of tort claims,
including claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and false light).
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from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine.” 78 This is a right of self-determination. Churches handle
their own affairs. 79 Church decisions are made by church authorities, not by
legislatures, administrative agencies, judges, or juries. 80 The government
does not subsidize the religious functions of churches; it does not regulate
those functions either. It does not dictate standards for religious behavior; it
does not monitor compliance with those standards; and it does not issue
licenses when they are satisfied or sanctions when they are not. Because the
government does not itself make religious decisions, it has nothing to say
about the religious decisions made by churches. If the government had a
basis for interfering in religious controversies within churches, it would
have a basis for interfering in religious controversies outside of churches.
These principles come out of the Supreme Court’s church autonomy
cases, probably the most complicated area of the Religion Clauses. But to
understand group freedom of religion, it helps to begin with individual
freedom of religion. There is widespread agreement that religious faith and
practice should be voluntary. This works smoothly enough with
individuals. Each person decides for himself or herself what to believe.
Within limits understandably imposed by the communal nature of society,
each person decides for himself or herself how to practice his or her faith as
well. No one gets to control another person’s religious conduct; no one has
the right to force his religion on someone else. The last two points have
become the core of the modern Establishment Clause: you have the right
not to sit through someone else’s church service, whether it is a long
service on Sunday 81 or a short prayer at a high school graduation or football
game. 82 The law often gives people control over other peoples’ choices.83

78

132 S. Ct. at 704 (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church
in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)); see also id. at 711–12 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The First
Amendment protects the freedom of religious groups to engage in certain key religious activities,
including the conducting of worship services and other religious ceremonies and rituals, as well as the
critical process of communicating the faith.”).
79
See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1981) (footnotes
omitted) (arguing that churches have the right “to select their own leaders, define their own doctrines,
resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions”).
80
See Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 254 (2009)
(“The essence of church autonomy is that the Catholic Church should be run by duly constituted
Catholic authorities and not by legislators, administrative agencies, labor unions, disgruntled lay people,
or other actors lacking authority under church law.”).
81
Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2144 (2003) (“In England, from the time of
Elizabeth I, those who ‘absented themselves from the divine worship in the established church’ were
subject to a fine of one shilling for a single absence and twenty pounds for a month’s absence.”
(alteration in original) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *52)).
82
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (football game); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992) (graduation).
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But the law does not give people control over other peoples’ religious
choices.
With groups, the principle is the same, but the implementation grows
more complicated. Each person’s right of religious exercise has to be
exercised in light of everyone else’s. This creates tensions, and the Court’s
church autonomy cases represent its attempts to cabin those tensions as
much as possible. The position they end up taking is that disgruntled
members of a church cannot sue to try and change the religious beliefs,
doctrines, and governance of their churches. For were that to happen, they
would effectively control everyone else’s religious choices.
One of the most important Supreme Court cases, Presbyterian Church
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 84 bears out these points most clearly. As in a
number of the church autonomy cases, the issue was what to do with the
property when a church split into two factions. The Georgia courts had
applied the old English rule, where courts would decide which of the two
factions came closest to the original beliefs of the church.85 The Supreme
Court in Mary Elizabeth unanimously held this unconstitutional. Its opinion
talks at length about how the rule requires courts to answer inappropriate
religious questions. 86 And when professors teach Mary Elizabeth, this is
where they tend to focus. 87 But there is another key point to the case. The
English rule had grown into a system where churches could not change
their religious doctrines without the risk of later losing their property. Even
a single dissenter that wanted things the old way could claim a departure
from doctrine and sue for control of the property. 88 The departure-fromdoctrine rule thus ended up reinforcing the status quo, a usually
conservative status quo. In Watson v. Jones, dissenters used it to try and
83

This is one way of seeing, for example, negligence law. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that the owner of a vessel that broke free of its moorings
negligently, and thus unlawfully, caused the sinking of another person’s ship).
84
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
85
Id. at 443–44.
86
See id. at 449 (“First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation
is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”).
87
See, e.g., EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS,
CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 899 (5th ed. 2014) (explaining Mary Elizabeth as part of a “no
religious decisions principle,” whereby “[g]overnment officials . . . may not interpret religious doctrine”
(emphasis omitted)); Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 57 (arguing that Mary Elizabeth establishes a principle that “courts must avoid
intervening in religious disputes when doing so would entail their deciding theological or ecclesiastical
questions”); Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1831, 1836 (2009) (explaining Mary Elizabeth as being about “the state’s incompetence
to decide matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice or belief”).
88
See Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REV.
1142, 1148 (1962) (“Read literally, the Lord Chancellor’s opinion [in the English departure-fromdoctrine case, Attorney General ex rel. Mander v. Pearson, (1817) 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch.)] seems to
brook no doctrinal evolution within a congregation except on pain of forfeiture of its property.”).
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seize property when the Presbyterian Church renounced slavery. 89 In Mary
Elizabeth, dissenters used it when the church decided to ordain women. 90 If
the rule existed today, it would be invoked by those upset by national
churches deciding to ordain gays and lesbians. 91
The lesson of Mary Elizabeth is that dissenters do not get to control
their churches through litigation. And in many modern cases, that is
precisely what is being sought, at least beneath the surface. A woman’s
husband becomes abusive. 92 But she is a Jehovah’s Witness, and Jehovah’s
Witnesses teach that marriage is permanent and that divorce is immoral.93
When she finally leaves her husband, she sues the church, claiming that she
would have left him a long time ago had it not been for the church’s
counseling. She thinks that the church caused those extra years of abuse,
and she may be right about that. But whether she is right about that or not,
her claim cannot go forward if the church has the right to teach what it
believes about marriage.
Mary Elizabeth is one of many cases where the Supreme Court has
dealt with two factions disputing over property. But, in an important sense,
a church’s religious beliefs, practices, and doctrines are just as rivalrous
and excludable as a church’s real property. Only one faction ultimately gets
the property; only one faction ultimately controls the church’s religious
beliefs and practices. In Mary Elizabeth and the other church property
cases, the Supreme Court has been clear: the duly constituted church
authorities get to decide. In the cases that this Article will soon address, the
same principle pushes toward the same conclusion.
In a sense, this also returns us to Hosanna-Tabor. In every ministerial
exception case, a minister has lost his church and cannot get it back
voluntarily. What the minister claims is a right to force the church back
involuntarily. His argument is essentially this: I have a right to practice
religion with them, no matter what they want.94 The ministerial exception
cuts this off at the knees. No one has the right to be a minister over a
congregation against its will. In a system where religion is voluntary, no

89

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
393 U.S. at 442 & n.1.
91
See, e.g., Rector v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of Ga., Inc., 718 S.E.2d 237 (Ga. 2011).
92
E.g., DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 829 A.2d 38 (Conn. App. Ct.
2003). But there is a long history of these cases. See, e.g., Radecki v. Schuckardt, 361 N.E.2d 543 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1976); Bradesku v. Antion, 255 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969); Carrieri v. Bush, 419 P.2d
132 (Wash. 1966).
93
See 1 INSIGHT ON THE SCRIPTURES 639–40 (Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society of
Pennsylvania 1988).
94
Sometimes plaintiffs’ attorneys have been a little too explicit about this. See Ferreira v. Harris,
No. 06-CV-0163-CVE-SAJ, 2006 WL 1720546, at *5 (N.D. Okla. June 20, 2006) (“Plaintiff claims he
has been denied his right to freely associate with a church of his choice by the actions of Woodland
View.”).
90
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one can have the right to practice religion with people who do not want to
practice religion with them. 95
Those who talk about church autonomy sometimes refer to the idea of
implied consent because it features prominently in Watson v. Jones, the
first church autonomy case: “All who unite themselves to such a body do
so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to
it.” 96 Implied consent gets a number of things right, but it can be
misleading. Take Hosanna-Tabor, for example. Ministers certainly do not
consent to discrimination. But they consent to being a minister in their
churches, and it is that consent which precludes them from challenging
how the church selects its ministers. Now maybe implied consent is not the
best phrase for this; this is probably more analogous to assumption of risk.
But of course it is true that implied consent is not consent, nor even a proxy
for consent. Implied consent is a fiction used to operationalize the
constitutional right of churches to have control over their own decisions.
With this conceptual background now in place, this Article divides the
field of legal obligations into two areas—imposed legal obligations and
assumed legal obligations. Imposed (or involuntary) legal obligations
include those of tort and criminal law, as well as those of labor law and
employment discrimination. The duties created by these laws are in no
sense assumed by the parties—they are imposed by the law. Law here does
not try to approximate human intentions; it is meant to override human
intentions. By contrast, assumed (or voluntary) legal obligations include
those of contract, property, and corporate law. The parties assume the
duties created here: they choose to enter into contracts, trusts, and corporate
arrangements.
Now, to be sure, this distinction is not airtight. One could argue, for
example, that employment law obligations are assumed. Churches would
be free of employment law if they choose not to hire people; churches that
hire less than fifteen people are still mostly free of federal employment
laws. 97 Because there is no general duty to rescue, one could say that all of
tort law is assumed; tort law only kicks in when one voluntarily chooses to
get involved with other people. 98 But we can only speak of private ordering
because we believe that this distinction reflects something real, no matter
how messy it ends up being in practice.

95
See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 n.5 (4th
Cir. 1985) (“No member of a church may claim, under the First Amendment, an enforceable right to be
considered or accepted by the church hierarchy as a minister.”).
96
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
97
See Lund, supra note 28, at 8–10 (discussing these points).
98
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (“The fact that the actor realizes or should
realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon
him a duty to take such action.”).
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Another reason to credit this distinction is that the Supreme Court has
now tacitly adopted it. This is clear when one contrasts Hosanna-Tabor
with the Court’s earlier decision in Jones v. Wolf. 99 One constitutional way
of resolving a property dispute between church factions, the Court said in
Jones, was through “neutral principles of law.” 100 Because churches could
freely structure their property arrangements as they wanted, courts could
use general principles of property law to discern where the church would
have wanted the property to go in the event of a split.101 Those who argued
against the ministerial exception relied heavily on Jones, saying that the
employment discrimination laws were also neutral principles of law.102 But
the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor ignored that argument; none of the
Hosanna-Tabor opinions even cite the case. The Court clearly thought
Jones irrelevant.
The reason for this seems obvious in retrospect: Jones and HosannaTabor belong to fundamentally different categories. Jones is a property
case, a case about assumed legal obligations, where applying the regular
rules of law heightens church autonomy by enabling churches to structure
their affairs as they want. Hosanna-Tabor is an employment case, a case
about imposed legal obligations, where applying the regular rules of law
undercuts church autonomy. These two situations require different
approaches, as the Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Hosanna-Tabor.
III. CHURCH AUTONOMY AND IMPOSED LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
When people think about constitutional freedoms, they typically
imagine suits between a private entity and the government. But
increasingly, the Supreme Court has had to address the effect of
constitutional rights on civil suits between private parties. Most cases have
involved the Free Speech Clause. 103 But speech is not special, or at least not
uniquely special. Every constitutional right requires some immunity from
generally applicable laws. A woman’s constitutional right to an abortion
would make little sense if the would-be father could sue the aborting

99

443 U.S. 595 (1979).
Id. at 604.
101
Id. at 603 (“[T]he neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems
in general—flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.
Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societies can specify what is to
happen to church property . . . .”).
102
See Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 21, at 12, 26–28; see also Corbin, supra note
57, at 957–58 (making this argument about Jones v. Wolf).
103
See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (dismissing intentional infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy claims as barred by the First Amendment); NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (dismissing interference with business relations
claims); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (dismissing defamation claims).
100
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woman for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 104 It would function
exactly like a requirement of spousal consent, held unconstitutional long
ago. 105 Roe v. Wade would break down if any woman who ended up
regretting her abortion could turn around and sue the clinic in a wrongful
death action. 106
Tort liability can also erode constitutional freedoms more subtly. Take
Doe v. Moe, 107 which involved a couple in a long-term, sexually active
relationship. One morning, they were having sex in one of their usual
positions. But she changed positions quickly and without warning, slipped
off of her partner, and fractured his penis. 108 So he sued her. The
Massachusetts Court of Appeals dismissed his case, saying that she owed
no legal duty to him. But taking this at face value misses the point, because
there is always a legal duty to avoid physically injuring someone else. 109
The court here crafted a special “no duty” rule for self-consciously
constitutional reasons. The court’s opinion cites all the usual suspects:
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Casey, and Lawrence. 110 And this makes sense. We
talk about a constitutional right to sexual liberty; Lawrence talks about how
“adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home [involves] vital interests in
liberty and privacy.” 111 But if the principle is that people should get to do
what they want behind closed doors without government interference, adult
104
In hearing such a case, Judge Posner put it well: “[W]e do not see how, as a matter of either
legal logic or common sense, the constitutional right of a woman to have an abortion without
interference from the man who impregnated her can coexist with a . . . right of the man to interfere.”
Coe v. Cnty. of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1998). Apparently the earliest case presenting this
fact pattern was Przybyla v. Przybyla, 275 N.W.2d 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978), which dismissed an exhusband’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against his former wife for having an
abortion. See id. at 115 (“We hold that the intentional exercise by a woman and her physician of her
right to terminate her pregnancy as protected by the United States Constitution, cannot constitute
conduct that is so extreme and outrageous that it meets the [requirement for intentional infliction of
emotional distress].”).
105
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding spousal consent
unconstitutional); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding
spousal notification unconstitutional).
106
See, e.g., Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (dismissing
various claims against an abortion clinic, including wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and alleged violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Act); Acuna v.
Turkish, 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007) (dismissing wrongful death, survival, and emotional distress claims).
107
827 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005).
108
“[T]he defendant landed awkwardly on the plaintiff, thereby causing him to suffer a penile
fracture.” Id. at 243. The plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured. The court noted that he
needed “emergency surgery,” then “endured a painful and lengthy recovery,” and still suffers “from
sexual dysfunction that neither medication nor counseling have been able to treat effectively.” Id.
109
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7(a) (2010) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise
reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”).
110
See Doe v. Moe, 827 N.E.2d at 245 & n.5 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003);
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965)).
111
539 U.S. at 564.
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men and women cannot sue each other for injuries arising out of sexual acts
to which they both freely consented. Juries do not decide which sexual
practices have benefits worth the risks. The diversity of sexual practices
requires that such decisions be made privately and not collectively.
The same is true for religion. (Replace “sexual” with “religious” in the
last two sentences—nothing should change.) Hosanna-Tabor begins
implementation of this principle by differentiating internal church matters.
With one eye on Hosanna-Tabor, and the other on the lower court cases we
will soon discuss, this Article suggests an overarching principle: absent
some compelling governmental interest, the First Amendment precludes
insiders from suing their churches over matters of significant religious
concern.
This first requires a discussion of insiders and outsiders. Insiders are
bound by the principles of church autonomy, but outsiders are not.112
Indeed, outsiders have constitutional rights against church autonomy; they
have constitutional rights to be free from the power of other peoples’
churches. This is one way of seeing the nondelegation cases; the leading
Supreme Court case here invalidated a statute giving churches power to
deny liquor licenses. 113
An important aspect of church autonomy is how every insider has the
right to leave, the right to become an outsider. Maybe this is part of the
church autonomy principle itself; maybe it describes the limits of church
autonomy. But either way, church autonomy implies a constitutional right
of exit from religious organizations. In discussing Hosanna-Tabor earlier,
we said that the ministerial exception entitles both sides—both ministers
and churches—to end the relationship at any time without legal liability.
This constitutional protection accorded to ministers is one aspect of their
constitutional right to exit.114
Though the distinction between insiders and outsiders makes intuitive
sense, the line between them is blurry. Hosanna-Tabor treats ministers as
insiders, barring their discrimination claims. Lower courts treat church
members as insiders, barring suits challenging defamation,
excommunication, or shunning. 115 But there are gray areas. A number of
recent suits involve children at Catholic schools challenging their
expulsions in court. Catholic schools are part of the Catholic Church. And
although they educate many non-Catholic students, those students chose a

112

See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012)
(“[T]he [ministerial] exception applies only to suits by or on behalf of ministers themselves.”).
113
See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating a statute that gave power
to churches and schools to prevent issuance of liquor licenses to establishments within 500 feet of
them); see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
114
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (discussing this point).
115
See infra notes 177–78 and accompanying text (providing examples).
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Catholic school. But this is a boundary question, and courts have split on
the answer. 116
This principle also requires a discussion of religiosity. The Free
Exercise Clause is implicated only when the government interferes with
religious beliefs or conduct.117 This is also true for church autonomy. 118
This is why the regular tort rules apply to someone hit by the church bus119
or by a falling gargoyle. 120 Those suits threaten no religious practice. But
once some religious practice is at stake, the First Amendment comes into
play. It should not matter whether the practice is considered obligatory or
not. 121 The Supreme Court has always been clear that religious actions are
protected, whether considered compulsory or not. 122 Hosanna-Tabor
reaffirms that position. 123 Yet lower courts sometimes get this wrong, with
unfortunate effects. In one recent case, for example, the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that a Buddhist group could be denied a permit for
constructing a religious temple, despite a federal law requiring the
government to offer a compelling governmental interest for any substantial
burden imposed on religious exercise. The Connecticut Supreme Court
116

See Connor v. Archdiocese of Phila., 975 A.2d 1084, 1090–92 (Pa. 2009) (providing citations
regarding the split in authority).
117
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“[T]o have the protection of the Religion
Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief.”).
118
See, e.g., Kubala v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 41 A.3d 351, 357 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2011) (“When a defendant raises the free exercise clause of the [F]irst [A]mendment as a defense,
the threshold question is whether the conduct of the defendants is religious.”), aff’d, 38 A.3d 1252
(Conn. App. Ct. 2012); Checkley v. Boyd, 14 P.3d 81, 87 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he success of a free
exercise defense to a tort claim depends as a threshold matter on whether the conduct or statements on
which liability is predicated were in fact religious in nature.”).
119
This hypothetical once actually arose. See, e.g., Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 1, 9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“Thus, driving a Sunday-School bus does not constitute a religious
practice merely because the bus is owned by a religion, the driver is an ordained minister of the
religion, and the bus is taking church members to a religious ceremony.” (citing Malloy v. Fong, 232
P.2d 241 (Cal. 1951) (involving a thirteen-year-old boy who sued a church’s seminarian for a car
accident on their way to vacation Bible school))).
120
See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The minister struck on the head
by a falling gargoyle as he is about to enter the church may have an actionable claim.”).
121
See Laycock, supra note 79, at 1390 (“One of the most common errors in free exercise analysis
is to try to fit all free exercise claims into the conscientious objector category and reject the ones that do
not fit.”).
122
In Smith, for example, the Supreme Court did not ask whether the use of peyote was religiously
required of the Native American Church plaintiffs. What was relevant was that the use of peyote was
part of a religious practice. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (describing the exercise
of religion as involving “acts or abstentions . . . [that] are engaged in for religious reasons”); id. at 893
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[C]onduct motivated by sincere religious belief . . . .”); see also Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (asking whether a practice was “rooted in religious belief”);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (“[F]ollowing the precepts of [one’s] religion . . . .”).
123
By holding the ministerial exception to be a categorical bar, Hosanna-Tabor made clear that it
did not matter whether the church’s decision was necessitated by religious doctrine. See Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (2012).
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concluded that the denial did not burden the group’s religious exercise,
apparently because the Buddhists had no religious objection to worshipping
outside. 124
Courts also must take care not to conceive of the religious interest at
stake too narrowly. Lawyers are not stupid; they will not openly challenge
religious practices. Take the case about the plaintiff who alleged that
church teaching caused her to stay with her abusive husband too long. 125
Rather than say that the church was wrong to teach that divorce was
immoral, plaintiffs will say that the church should have referred her to a
more professional counselor, or should have pressured the husband into
therapy, or done some other such thing. Plaintiffs will plead their case
around the religious issues.
Defamation claims provide another example. Unless Hosanna-Tabor
puts some limits on defamation claims, plaintiffs need only rephrase their
pleadings to avoid the ministerial exception.126 Unable to argue that they
were fired for wrong reasons, ministers will simply claim that the
congregation stated wrong reasons in coming to its decision. This would be
an end-run around the ministerial exception, but courts have sometimes
bought into its logic. 127 Self-governance—and Hosanna-Tabor’s principle,
again, of one of self-governance—requires freedom of speech, which
demands free and open lines of communication.128 Churches have the right
not only to dismiss ministers and expel congregants, but to freely talk about
why ministers should be dismissed and congregants expelled. It would
make no sense otherwise. It would encourage the worst kind of church
decisionmaking otherwise. But only if courts adopt a bird’s-eye view will
they be able to recognize the religious interests at play here.
124

See Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of Conn., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 941 A.2d 868,
888 (Conn. 2008) (explaining that “building and owning a church is a desirable accessory of worship,
not a fundamental tenet of the [c]ongregation’s religious beliefs” (quoting Lakewood, Ohio
Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 1983)))
(alteration in original).
125
See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 829 A.2d 38 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003)).
126
See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between
Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 155 (2009) (arguing that to
allow defamation claims in this context would be to allow “a collateral attack on a decision that is
otherwise solidly protected by the ministerial exception”).
127
See Tubra v. Cooke, 225 P.3d 862, 872 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
128
For a recent, interesting, and important extension of this principle, see Purdum v. Purdum, 301
P.3d 718 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013). In Purdum, a man brought a defamation suit against his former wife for
things she said about him during a religious annulment proceeding in the Catholic Church. The Court
dismissed the case as barred by the First Amendment. Id. at 727 (noting that “[t]here is no doubt that the
First Amendment offers no protection to religious worshipers who make slanderous or libelous
statements outside ecclesiastical tribunals, but that is not the case here” because the wife “asked for an
annulment in a church forum as part of a church-approved, church-defined, and church-controlled
process where the church would determine the validity of the church’s marriage sacrament”).
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In addition to insider status and religiosity, the familiar idea of rules
and standards also comes into play here. 129 Courts are (and should be)
particularly suspicious about imposing liability on religious behavior
through amorphous standards. 130 The lack of notice, combined with
discretion as regards liability, creates tremendous potential for mischief.
Yet there is also a deep suspicion of standards particular to the Free
Exercise Clause. Before Smith, the Court had used a compelling interest
test in Free Exercise cases, a test associated chiefly with two cases:
Sherbert and Yoder. Sherbert involved a standard—South Carolina only
gave unemployment compensation to people who had “good cause” for
refusing to work. 131 Yoder involved a rule—Wisconsin children under the
age of sixteen had to attend public school. 132 Smith overruled the
compelling interest test, but it overruled neither Sherbert nor Yoder. The
Court’s preservation of Yoder has always perplexed commentators. 133 But
its preservation of Sherbert—which is now the “individualized
exemptions” exception to Smith—fits perfectly with Smith’s emphasis on
general applicability. 134 At its root, this is because so much of the
constitutional danger in Sherbert flowed from the dangers of discrimination
arising from an amorphous standard being used to judge religious
behavior. 135
Finally, any account of church autonomy must acknowledge situations
where religious freedom will have to be subordinated to other values. Even
at the zenith of the Free Exercise Clause, courts refused regulatory
exemptions in cases where there was some compelling governmental
interest, and the same principle carries over to ideas about church
129
“Rules are legal norms that are formal and mechanical. They are triggered by a few easily
identified factual matters and are opaque in application to the values that they are designed to serve.
Standards, on the other hand, are flexible, context-sensitive legal norms that require evaluative
judgments in their application.” Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 739, 740 (1997).
130
See infra notes 144–53 (discussing the rule–standard distinction in the context of several cases).
131
Sherbert involved a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday (her Sabbath) and
sought unemployment compensation benefits. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).
132
Yoder involved a number of Amish families who sought to end their children’s public schooling
after the eighth grade. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
133
See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1121–22 (1990) (arguing that “the Smith Court’s [distinction of Yoder and its] notion of
‘hybrid’ claims was not intended to be taken seriously”).
134
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“[W]here the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that
system to cases of religious hardship without compelling reason.”).
135
That Sherbert involved a vague standard has been largely forgotten now. Smith recast Sherbert
simply as an equality case. But in his Sherbert dissent, Justice Harlan pointed out that there was no
evidence that anyone had ever, for any reason, been allowed to refuse to work on Saturday and still
receive unemployment compensation. There was no equality problem in Sherbert, but the Court
awarded a religious exception anyway because of the vagueness of the rule. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
420 & n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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autonomy. 136 Individuals cannot involuntarily sacrifice their neighbors as
part of their religious observance—and neither can churches (even if the
sacrifices were voluntary). 137 Churches obviously have no license to
sexually abuse children. 138 Every constitutional right is exercised within
bounds, and any theory that hopes to have some practical reality must take
practical reality into account. Church autonomy is church autonomy within
limits, and no more.
The question of when the government’s interest in regulation
outweighs the interest in church autonomy is a question that admits of clear
answers only in clear cases. This raises an important concern about the
appropriateness and difficulty of judicial interest balancing. 139 This concern
cannot be buried. Instead, the response can only be that some balancing is
unavoidable, that the principle is worth the balancing, and that in many
particular circumstances, sufficiently definite rules can indeed be worked
out. Yet in the sections that follow, this Article will keep such concerns in
mind as it tries to lay out, in as much detail as possible, a concrete and
judicially manageable conception of church autonomy.
A. Negligence, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and the Like
Before we turn to the areas of disagreement, it helps to start where
there is consensus. Courts are deeply split on many issues, but they all
agree that the First Amendment prohibits tort claims of clergy
malpractice. 140 Some have suggested that this is just a matter of equality
and consistent with Smith—what makes the tort of clergy malpractice
impermissible is the fact that it applies only to clergy. 141 But this cannot
136
See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (discussing the compelling interest test for Free
Exercise).
137
See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,
49–50 (1890) (“The practice of suttee by the Hindu widows may have sprung from a supposed religious
conviction. . . . But no one, on that account, would hesitate to brand [such] practices, now, as crimes
against society.”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“Suppose one believed that
human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the
civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”).
138
See infra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing the sex abuse cases).
139
This concern is articulated well in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 126, at 133 (pointing out that “the
[same] questions of measurement and even-handedness raised [by modern arguments for church
autonomy were] once employed—but now abandoned—in free exercise exemption cases”).
140
See, e.g., Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 608 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (“There is no such thing in the law as clerical malpractice.”); DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible &
Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 829 A.2d 38, 46 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (“[C]ourts throughout the United
States have uniformly rejected claims for clergy malpractice under the First Amendment.” (quoting
Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 204 (Utah 2001))); Mark E.
Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (2003) (“Courts
have universally rejected claims of clergy malpractice.”).
141
See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Separation, Neutrality, and Clergy Liability for Sexual
Misconduct, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1921, 1943 n.103 (“Neutrality would presumably also not recognize
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explain it. Clergy malpractice is a form of malpractice, and malpractice is a
religion-neutral tort. Every court in this country will let you sue your doctor
and lawyer for malpractice, yet none of them will let you sue your rabbi or
priest. 142 Only if religion is special does this make sense.
It is worth lingering over the reasons courts dismiss such suits. Clergy
malpractice is a form of malpractice, which in turn is a form of
negligence.143 And negligence carries with it certain problems. Negligence
is, in a sense, the converse of contract. Contract imposes duties to which
the parties themselves agreed, in circumstances where they would have
expected legal enforcement. Negligence imposes duties that a jury
essentially believes the parties should have agreed to, in situations where
they certainly did not, and in circumstances where legal enforcement was
not remotely contemplated. And by and large, the negligence tort turns over
legal power to juries for them to decide on the legal duties they think
appropriate to impose. 144
In the context of religious behavior, this gives juries the power to
decide what religious beliefs, practices, and doctrines are acceptable and
which ones are not. To be sure, juries are told about the “reasonably
prudent” standard, and directed to balance costs and benefits. But they
themselves decide what counts as a cost and what counts as a benefit. 145

civil actions based upon claims of clergy malpractice because clergy malpractice is a religion-specific
action and is therefore not neutral.”).
142
There may be one exception in Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991), which left open the
possibility of such a claim. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical
Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1816 n.100 (discussing Faber).
143
“After all, malpractice is nothing but a species of negligence.” Michael Sean Quinn, The
Advice-of-Counsel Defense: A Response to Fischer, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1498 n.39 (1994); see also
Rubens v. Mason, 387 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[L]egal malpractice is a species of negligence.”);
DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 471 (4th ed. 2011) (“Medical
malpractice is a species of negligence.”). Some think of malpractice as slightly different from
negligence in terms of the standard of care. In a negligence action, the defendant is judged by a
reasonable person standard; in a medical malpractice action, she is judged by a reasonable doctor
standard. See 3 WILLIAM W. BASSETT ET AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 11:53, at
11-280 to -281 (2013) (noting that “[t]he differentiating characteristic between ordinary negligence and
malpractice is that malpractice is measured on a higher standard” because in malpractice cases the
“defendant has a special form of competence that creates a different standard of care than that of the
reasonable layperson”). Yet this does not distinguish malpractice and negligence because even in
garden-variety negligence cases, the standard of care rises with the skills and capacities of the
defendant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
144
Kenneth Abraham notes that “[n]o matter how negligence is defined in instructions to the jury,
or in the law applied by a judge in a bench trial, the negligence standard is abstract and general,” and so
“[w]ithin wide bounds, the finder of fact does not identify a pre-existing norm, but simultaneously
determines for itself what would constitute reasonable behavior under the circumstances and then
applies this norm to the situation at hand.” Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence,
54 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1191 (2001) (footnote omitted).
145
See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common
Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 435 (1999) (“That the issue of breach is put to the jury even when facts
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Many religious actions and doctrines seem strange or incomprehensible to
the general populace. Juries drawn from the general community will not
see the benefits of religious beliefs and practices the same way as those
inside the church. If they did, they would belong to the church! Every jury
will do some discounting. Some jurors will be skeptical; others will be
hostile. If you see religion as having little value, any cost or risk will be
enough to tip the scale in favor of liability. If you see religion as having no
value, any allegation of cost or risk will be enough. This cannot be squared
with the First Amendment. The First Amendment protects the free exercise
of religion. It does not protect the free exercise of religion when it is
reasonably prudent. We have many religions in this country that some jury
will find imprudent. The obnoxious, the hypocrites, the discrete and insular
minorities—they get to practice their religions too.
The first American case of clergy malpractice involved a young man,
Kenneth Nally, who suffered from depression. 146 He went to the pastors at
his church for counseling. They tried to get him to go to a psychiatric
hospital and to trained secular psychologists, but he refused and ended up
committing suicide. His parents brought suit against the church, alleging
that the pastors should have counseled Nally better and done a better job
trying to get him into nonreligious counseling. 147 They were especially
angry that Nally’s pastor told him that suicide would not endanger his
salvation: “[A] person who is once saved is always saved,” he said. 148
Dismissing the case on nonconstitutional grounds, the California Supreme
Court held that the church owed no legal duty to Nally. But it added that
any sort of duty here would “stifle all gratuitous or religious counseling,”149
thus making it “quite possibly unconstitutional.” 150
Similar to Nally is the DeCorso case, discussed supra, about the
Jehovah’s Witness who had been in an abusive marriage. DeCorso sued her
church, claiming that she would have left her husband years earlier had it
not been for the church’s teaching about the immorality of divorce. Both
Nally and DeCorso involve terribly tragic injuries. But they also involve
plaintiffs who seek control over church teaching. Some Evangelical
Protestants teach the perseverance of the saints; the Jehovah’s Witnesses
teach the immorality of divorce.151 This is their right. “The government
are free of doubt shows that in negligence law independent value is put on the jury deciding what is
reasonable conduct when the normative issue is open to debate.”).
146
See Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); 3 BASSETT ET AL., supra note 143,
§ 11:53, at 11-284 (footnote omitted) (“Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley was the first
clergy malpractice case ever filed in the United States.”).
147
See Nally, 763 P.2d at 952–53.
148
Id. at 952 (statement of Pastor Thomson).
149
Id. at 959.
150
Id. at 960.
151
For another case akin to DeCorso, see Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001). In Franco, a fourteen-year-old child recalled that, when she was seven, an
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may not . . . punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be
false.” 152 Or, even more eloquently:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of
their religious doctrines or beliefs. . . . [I]f those doctrines are subject to trial
before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be
done with the religious beliefs of any sect. 153

That these cases even exist proves how the bare right to believe one’s faith
and teach it to others can still be controversial.
It is important to stress one other point. Courts and commentators
frequently suggest that the motivating principle here is that courts lack
competence to come up with the standard of care. 154 This can be a problem,
but it is not the real problem. 155 A Seventh-Day Adventist sues her SeventhDay Adventist high school, claiming that she “was subjected to an inferior
and substandard Biblical Christian education.”156 The court should dismiss
this claim (and it did). 157 But it is not out of an inability to come up with a
older boy in her church congregation had sexually abused her. Her parents asked church leaders what to
do; they advised her to “forgive, forget, and seek [a]tonement.” Id. at 201. Her parents did that, but later
changed their minds and went to the police. They then sued the church for the heightened emotional
distress due to the delay, and for the emotional distress due to being ostracized by the church
community for not taking the advice. Id.
152
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
153
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1944).
154
See, e.g., F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703 (N.J. 1997) (“[S]uch a [malpractice] claim
requires definition of the relevant standard of care [and] [d]efining that standard . . . would require
courts to identify the beliefs and practices of the relevant religion and then to determine whether the
clergyman had acted in accordance with them.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 142, at 1823 (“Courts have
good reason to reject claims of clergy malpractice when such claims invite the court to determine the
standard of pastoral care for a ‘reasonable Catholic priest’ or a ‘reasonable Orthodox rabbi’ [because]
[t]hese are judgments that only that particular religious tradition can render and are precisely the kinds
of appraisals that the doctrine of ecclesiastical immunity bars.”).
155
Admittedly, in some cases, the problem grows severe. E.g., Lightman v. Flaum (Lightman I),
687 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999), rev’d, 761 N.E.2d 1027 (N.Y. 2001) (Lightman II). In
Lightman I, a wife told two rabbis that she was seeing another man and that she was no longer engaging
in the ritual purification required by Jewish law (failing to do so meant that she would not have to have
sex with her husband). The rabbis told the husband, and in response the wife sued them for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and other claims. The trial court let these claims proceed, saying that the
rabbis’ actions were “outrageous and most offensive,” that “no member of the clergy . . . would dare
breach the sanctity of his or her office to make public th[is] type of confidential, private disclosure[],”
and that “neither defendant had a ‘religious obligation as a Rabbi’ to make public what had been
imparted to them.” Lightman I, 687 N.Y.S.2d at 569–70. But on appeal, the rabbis indeed indicated that
they had a religious obligation to tell the husband of the wife’s infidelity. See Lightman II, 761 N.E.2d
at 1029. Rather than try to resolve this debate about Jewish law, the New York Court of Appeals
dismissed the case on other grounds. Id. at 1033.
156
Houston v. Mile High Adventist Acad., 846 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D. Colo. 1994) (quoting the
plaintiff’s complaint).
157
Id. (“[M]y adjudication of whether Andrea was provided an adequate Biblical Christian
education in accordance with the tenets of the Seventh Day Adventist church is barred by the [F]irst
[A]mendment.”).
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standard of care. If we did not care about religious liberty, we would just
turn it over to the lawyers to inform the jury about Seventh-Day Adventist
theology and the reasonable expectations of Seventh-Day Adventists
sending their kids to high school. But no court would do that. No matter
how clear the standard of care for religious education happens to be, it is
simply not something that the government enforces. If you do not like the
religious education provided by your religious school, you have options.
You can explain to your children how the school is wrong theologically;
you can push for change internally; you can petition the higher church
authorities (if there are any); you can find a different religious school; or
you can send your kids to public school. But you cannot get the
government to force the school to teach your version of Christianity,
because you have no right to control the religious education of all the other
children at that school.
This is not just about religious beliefs and religious teachings—it is
about religious practices as well. Consider Kubala v. Hartford Roman
Catholic Diocesan Corp.158 Kubala involved a type of Catholic charismatic
healing service, in which congregants would approach the altar to be
prayed over by a priest. They then would rest in the spirit, falling back into
the arms of a catcher. Dorothy Kubala had attended these services at this
church for years. According to her complaint, during one service, she came
under the influence of the Holy Spirit while at the altar and fell back, but
was not caught properly. She hit her head and was badly hurt.159 She
brought suit, claiming several ways in which the church was negligent. The
church should have conducted the service with people sitting or kneeling
rather than standing, it should have put pads down around the altar, it
should have warned people more explicitly about the dangers inherent in
resting in the spirit, it should have selected better catchers, and it should
have had better training for the catchers that it used. 160 All in all, she
claimed that the priests and the church “failed to utilize that degree of care
and skill or diligence ordinarily exercised by charismatic priests and
churches in the Catholic Charismatic Revival.” 161 The Connecticut Superior
Court dismissed the case on First Amendment grounds, saying that the
plaintiff’s claims were all “based on the defendants’ allegedly negligent
performance of the healing ritual,” and that “[t]he performance of a
religious healing ritual certainly falls under the types of doctrines and
practices which the [F]irst [A]mendment is designed to protect.” 162

158

41 A.3d 351 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 38 A.3d 1252 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 354–55 (summarizing the facts and concluding that Kubala “suffered severe and painful
injuries as a result”).
160
Id. at 355, 363.
161
Id. at 355.
162
Id. at 357.
159
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Kubala illustrates all the dangers that can arise from thoughtlessly
applying regular tort rules to constitutionally protected behavior. The
plaintiff probably sees this case as easy. She was injured, the church caused
her injuries, and so the church should pay. But her suit really claims that
the healing service here was illegal. That is strong language, but it is the
right language. Torts are illegal acts. 163 Tort liability is government
regulation, legally indistinguishable from a civil fine.164 If Dorothy Kubala
wins this case, it is a judicial declaration that the way the church conducted
this healing service was illegal. And it will threaten charismatic healing
services everywhere.
To be sure, neither Kubala nor any other plaintiff will claim that all
charismatic healing services are illegal. They will simply say that this
charismatic healing service was not done right. But this is a problem with
regulation-by-tort: if a jury imposes liability, it will be unclear what exactly
the church needs to do to avoid liability in the future, because it will be
unclear why the jury imposed liability in the first place. Is it enough that
the church puts a warning in the bulletin? Is it enough that the church lays
down pads around the altar? A statute that laid out criteria for Catholic
charismatic healing rituals would be unconstitutional. 165 But it would be
better than handling this through tort law, because there is no safe harbor in
tort law. Whatever precautions the church takes, the next jury may well
find them insufficient. Lurking in the background, of course, is the reality
that some juries will see any precautions as insufficient. They will not say
this; they may not even consciously think it. But juries drawn from the
outside world will have a hard time seeing the benefit of charismatic
worship, and any injured plaintiff will be proof enough that the practice is
too dangerous. The safe course for the church will be not to have any sort
of charismatic healing service at all. But this chilling effect would intrude
deeply on First Amendment freedoms—it would transform worship in the
denominations that conduct these services.
This is not to say that Kubala is an easy case. There is an important
difference between cases challenging church beliefs and those challenging
church practices. We all still believe, as Jefferson did, that there is a
difference between beliefs and acts. 166 Maybe, all things considered,
163

See Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 345 (1879) (“[T]he very essence of a tort is that it
is an unlawful act . . . .”).
164
See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 n.17 (1996) (“State power may be
exercised as much by a jury’s application of a state rule of law in a civil lawsuit as by a statute.”).
165
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (“At a
minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue . . . regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”).
166
In his letter to the General Assembly of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson wrote: “That to suffer the
civil Magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of [religious] opinion, and to restrain the profession
or propagation of [religious] principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy,
which at once destroys all religious liberty . . . That it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil
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recovery is justified in Kubala. My problem is with courts that fail to
appreciate what is at stake. There is a case whose facts are almost identical
to Kubala, where liability was upheld on appeal without the appellate court
detecting even the slightest constitutional problem. 167
Intentional infliction of emotional distress creates similar kinds of
problems. If negligence permits the free exercise of religion only when
reasonably prudent, the emotional distress tort permits the free exercise of
religion only when not overly offensive. In some sense, the emotional
distress tort is even more dangerous to constitutional values. Negligence
traditionally required some sort of physical or economic impact; the
emotional distress tort never did. 168 Juries can impose liability on almost
any act they find sufficiently outrageous. 169 This has created some real
problems, even outside the religious context. 170 And within the religious
context, the effects have been extreme. A series of cases imposed enormous
damages on unpopular minority groups, usually Scientologists and Hare
Krishnas, for what juries claimed were improper methods of religious
indoctrination. 171 The lesson here seems to be that “given the opportunity to
assess damages against religious organizations and officials for religiously
motivated ‘outrageous’ conduct, juries do so with gusto.” 172
Many religions teach and do things that outsiders find outrageous.
Everyday acts of church discipline, for example, seem outrageous to
outsiders. Churches enforce certain standards, and expel or punish those
who fail to meet them. Some shun those who have extramarital sex, 173 or
government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good
order . . . .” 5 PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 77 (1987).
167
See Dadd v. Mount Hope Church & Int’l Outreach Ministries, No. 278861, 2009 WL 961516
(Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2009) (upholding a jury verdict of over $300,000 to a congregant who hit her
head on the floor while slain in the spirit, without any reference to the First Amendment).
168
See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 56–57
(1982) (explaining that the emotional distress tort “resembles negligence in that the defendant’s conduct
is evaluated in terms of a vague standard,” but that there is no “requirement of a palpable, physical
injury”).
169
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) (“Generally, the case is one in which the
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the
actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”).
170
See Givelber, supra note 168, at 52 (“[T]hat civil liability should turn on the resentments of the
average member of the community appears to turn the passions of the moment into law.”); see also
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (“‘Outrageousness’ . . . has an inherent
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or
views . . . .”).
171
Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated “Outrageous” Conduct: Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against “Other People’s Faiths,” 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579, 615–
22 (1993).
172
Id. at 617.
173
See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987);
Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007).
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who speak out against the church, 174 or who commit heresy. 175 They do so
for theological reasons, drawn from religious teaching, thinking it is the
best way to encourage the expelled to reform and to protect those who
remain. But juries will not be inclined to see religious discipline as an
attempt to maintain social and doctrinal unity in an increasingly secular
world. They will ask why the church could not maintain unity in some
other way. They will ask why the church did not have better procedures to
determine wrongdoing, why the scriptural text or church teaching should
necessarily be read that particular way, why certain immoral acts get
treated differently than others, and why religious groups that are supposed
to be about forgiveness somehow cannot forgive.
The Supreme Court, more than a century ago, said that courts must
stay out of this business: “[W]e have no power to revise or question
ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision from membership.” 176
Lower courts have followed suit, dismissing emotional distress claims
stemming from acts of excommunication and shunning. 177 Some say the
principle here is one of equality and consistent with Smith. 178 But again this
is not true. Courts in these cases do not instruct juries to ignore the
religious dimensions to these cases; they do not try to somehow separate
the secular part from the religious part, and then compensate only for the
former. They simply dismiss these cases. Churches have the right to expel
their members for the same kinds of reasons that churches have the right to
expel their ministers. Determining whether someone was expelled for a
good or bad religious reason is difficult. But more fundamentally, it is not
the jury’s job to decide which religious reasons are good and which are
bad. No one has the right to be a member of a church that does not want
him.
174
See, e.g., Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1975); Anderson v.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., No. M2004-01066-COA-R9-CV, 2007 WL 161035
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2007).
175
See, e.g., Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. App. 2000); cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (involving a minister removed from her
position for violating internal religious rules).
176
Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139 (1872). The Court continued, “[W]e cannot
decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been regularly
or irregularly cut off.” Id. at 139–40.
177
See, e.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1987);
Marks v. Estate of Hartgerink, 528 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1995); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389
(Tex. 2007); Korean Presbyterian Church v. Lee, 880 P.2d 565 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
178
Eugene Volokh, for example, says, “[I]f a church inflicts emotional distress on the politician by
excommunicating him, the excommunication would be constitutionally protected under the Free
Exercise Clause.” Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1299
(2005). This result, he says, is required because the “emotional distress that flows from the religiosity of
the offensive conduct, like emotional distress that flows from the content of people’s speech, may not
form the basis of legal liability even under the generally applicable emotional distress tort.” Id.
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To be sure, some of these claims are sympathetic and well-intentioned.
Orthodox Jews have pointed out a very troubling problem in their own
communities about the rules regarding divorce.179 Jewish law prevents a
wife from getting a religious divorce without the consent of her husband.
This, in turn, has unequal effects on the two parties. A still-married woman
who cohabits with a new partner is seen as an adulterer, and children born
of that union are stigmatized. But a still-married man can cohabitate
without it being seen as adulterous, and children of that union are not
humiliated. To some, tort law is the answer to this religious problem. Tort
law should be used to force the husband into giving his wife a religious
divorce. 180
But the gender inequity here is a belief and practice of Orthodox
Judaism. Maybe it should change. But it should change because Orthodox
Jews change it, not because the state changes it. The state does not reform
Orthodox Judaism, even at the insistence of a substantial fraction of
Orthodox Jews. And if Orthodox Judaism fails to change its practices, it
may well lose members or even fall apart. But which religions survive is
not the concern of the government. We have no established church;
religions here do not get propped up by the state. Whether religions flourish
or fail depends on the choices they make. The government does not punish
them for those choices, but it also does not shield them from the
consequences of those choices.
Other kinds of torts, like breach of fiduciary duty, should be treated
the same way as negligence and emotional distress claims. Insiders should
not be able to bring suits that impinge on a church’s chosen religious
beliefs or practices. Substance should be more important than form—
constitutional protection should not depend on the elements of state tort
law. 181 Claims that a church committed malpractice should thus be treated
the same, whether they are styled as negligence claims, breach of fiduciary
duty claims, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims, or something

179
Good introductions to this issue are Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using
Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781,
811–12 (1998), and Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial
Agreements, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 359, 364–70 (1999).
180
This kind of religious divorce is known as a “get.” See, e.g., Alan C. Lazerow, Give and “Get”?
Applying the Restatement of Contracts to Determine the Enforceability of “Get Settlement” Contracts,
39 U. BALT. L. REV. 103, 124 (2009) (footnote omitted) (discussing how “many authors have argued
that [women denied a get] can recover from their recalcitrant husbands under the widely-accepted tort
of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)”); see also David M. Cobin, Jewish Divorce and
the Recalcitrant Husband—Refusal to Give a Get as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 4 J.L.
& RELIGION 405 (1986).
181
See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“[A] State cannot foreclose the
exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels.” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429
(1963))).
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else. 182 But courts sometimes falter. In a fit of formalism, courts sometimes
label something a clergy malpractice claim when they want to dismiss it
and a negligence claim when they do not.183
Finally, it is worth spending a moment on claims that should not be
barred. Claims by outsiders are unaffected by the principle of church
autonomy, because religious groups have no right to affect nonconsenting
outsiders. And every insider has a constitutional right to become an
outsider. 184 In the brainwashing cases against the Hare Krishnas and the
Scientologists, tort judgments were often based on flimsy reasons. 185 But if
churches physically prevented people from leaving, liability would be an
easy case. One difficult case involved a church member accused of
violating a church prohibition on fornication.186 In the middle of the church
disciplinary proceedings, she tried to quit the church. Yet the church
refused to stop the disciplinary proceeding. She sued and won a substantial
jury verdict. 187 And on appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court generally
agreed with the jury. The church’s actions were constitutionally protected
up to the moment she withdrew, but the church had to immediately
abandon the disciplinary proceedings once she abandoned the church. This
makes sense in a certain way: no one believes that churches can continue to
harry people who have long left the church. But at the same time,
individuals cannot have a unilateral right to shut down church proceedings.
One has the right to never get on a roller coaster, but one has no right to
insist that the roller coaster stop halfway up the hill (or halfway down the
hill, for that matter). Yet this situation sits right on the fault line.
Finally, claims that do not impinge on the church’s religious beliefs
and practices are not barred either. There is no problem with liability in a
182

See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1438 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J., concurring) (noting that a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty is “simply an elliptical way of alleging clergy malpractice”); Schmidt
v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[A]s with her negligence claim, [the plaintiff’s]
fiduciary duty claim is merely another way of alleging that the [clergyman] grossly abused his pastoral
role, that is, that he engaged in malpractice.” (emphasis omitted)); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d
446, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (“[W]e will not determine the justiciability of [the plaintiff’s] counts based
upon the nomenclature used by the plaintiff . . . .”); Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter–Day
Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 205 (Utah 2001) (“[D]espite [the] characterization of her negligence-based claims
as gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty, we must
deal with the real issue here—clergy malpractice.”).
183
See, e.g., Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 387 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (“Characterizing
plaintiff’s claim as one for ‘clerical malpractice,’ [the defendant] argues that recognizing such a cause
of action would require the court to develop a standard of care for pastoral counseling, an undertaking
which inevitably would violate the First Amendment . . . . However, plaintiff’s complaint alleges simple
negligence.”).
184
See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text (elaborating on this point).
185
See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text (elaborating on this point).
186
See Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989).
187
In the resulting suit, the plaintiff was awarded $390,000 in damages as well as prejudgment
interest. Id. at 769.
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slip-and-fall case that happens in the church parking lot. It usually does not
even occur to defendants in those cases to raise the First Amendment as a
defense, and it does not matter whether the plaintiffs are members of the
church or not. 188 The clergy sex abuse cases also probably fall into this
category, although a full discussion of those cases is impossible here. 189
B. Battery, False Imprisonment, and the Like
Many courts, even those that dismiss negligence or emotional distress
claims, often remark about how torts like battery and false imprisonment
are different. Liability there, these courts suggest, should raise no
constitutional issues. 190 This common intuition makes a great deal of sense,
but it is perhaps more complicated than commentators have suggested.
Consider a recent decision by the Texas Supreme Court: Pleasant Glade
Assembly of God v. Schubert. 191 The case involved a seventeen-year-old
girl, Laura Schubert, and her family’s church, Pleasant Glade Assembly of
God. 192 Pleasant Glade Assembly of God was a Pentecostal church that held
itself out as adhering to a literal interpretation of the Bible, including the
Bible’s passages about spirits, demons, and demon possession. One Friday,
Laura Schubert attended a youth group event at her church. After reports
that someone saw a demon, the youth minister led the group in anointing
the church in oil and casting out the demons. Schubert returned to the
church for two services on Sunday.
The important events began with the Sunday evening service. During
that service, Schubert collapsed to the ground, claiming that demons were
after her. Church members then held her down as part of an exorcism.
Schubert clenched her fists, gritted her teeth, made guttural noises, and
188

See Proto v. Most Holy Trinity, No. CV095005234S, 2011 WL 2478309 (Conn. Super. Ct. May
25, 2011) (involving a plaintiff who alleged that he “was walking back to his vehicle, which was parked
in a parking lot adjacent to the Church, when he ‘tripped and was caused to fall and/or slip on and/or
over a cement speed bump that was in the parking lot,’ thereby sustaining personal injuries”); see also
Hanson v. Saint Luke’s United Methodist Church, 704 N.E.2d 1020 (Ind. 1998) (citing other cases).
189
Others have looked at those cases thoughtfully and in detail. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 142.
Douglas Laycock rightly points out how claims in a few of these cases would have far-reaching
implications that would create serious religious liberty problems, but those seem to be atypical. See
Laycock, supra note 80, at 273–74.
190
See Higgins v. Maher, 258 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (barring claims of
intentional defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but saying that “torts such as
battery, false imprisonment or conversion cannot be perpetrated upon its members with civil
impunity”). A number of other cases have similar language. See Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987); Dobrota v. Free Serbian Orthodox Church, 952
P.2d 1190, 1195 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 885 (D.C. 2002); Glass v.
First United Pentecostal Church of DeRidder, 676 So. 2d 724, 737 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Tidman v.
Salvation Army, No. 01-A-01-9708-CV00380, 1998 WL 391765, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15, 1998);
Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 554 (Tex. App. 2006).
191
See 264 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
192
For the facts that follow, see id. at 1–5.
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sometimes demanded to be freed. She came back to the church on Monday
and again on Tuesday. On Wednesday, similar things happened. She again
collapsed and writhed on the floor; church members again forcibly held her
down, praying for her and trying to help her. On both occasions, Schubert
suffered scrapes, carpet burns, and bruises. She initially did not mention
any of this to her parents. But eventually she did, and eventually the
Schubert family parted ways with the church and brought suit against it. In
a 5–4 decision, the Texas Supreme Court held that Schubert’s claims of
assault, battery, and false imprisonment were all barred by the First
Amendment. Its logic was similar to the Kubala case. 193 Schubert was a
member of the church, seeking to impose liability on the church because of
what occurred during its long-established religious beliefs and practices.
Unlike the claims in the last Part, these should go forward to a jury.
Perhaps part of it is that the case involves physical injury, although the
same could be said for Kubala. Perhaps another part is that assault, battery,
and false imprisonment involve rules rather than standards, which do not
ask open-ended questions about the reasonableness or outrageousness of
religious conduct. 194 But the best reason relates back to consent as the
justification for church autonomy. Consent here has a double meaning and
a double effect—it is part both of the church autonomy analysis and of the
intentional tort analysis. If Schubert consented to the exorcism, then her
intentional tort claims should fail for reasons unrelated to the religious
context of her injuries. If Schubert did not consent, then her claims should
succeed because the elements of the tort are satisfied and because that same
lack of consent simultaneously vitiates any claim of church autonomy. 195
Schubert cannot sue about church practices in which she voluntarily
participated. But she also has the right to leave the church at any time. An
old case involved a Catholic priest who sued his superiors for committing
him to a Catholic asylum where he would not be freed until he confessed
his sins. 196 Recovery in that case is easy; and recovery in Schubert’s case is
similarly easy if the facts are as she alleges.
Schubert’s claim should go forward, but there is still a vexing problem
here. The culture gap between any jury and this church will be enormous.
Texas has many Christian churches. But few Christians really believe in
demons as a regularly occurring physical phenomenon, and even fewer
193

See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text (discussing Kubala).
See, e.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2008)
(Jefferson, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that “[f]alse imprisonment does
not require a showing of outrageous conduct” and “[e]valuating whether Pleasant Glade falsely
imprisoned Schubert does not require the factfinder to determine the objective truth or falsity of the
defendants’ belief”).
195
The opinions in the case recognize this. See id. at 23 n.1 (Green, J., dissenting) (“If Schubert
had consented to the church’s actions, the consent—under our familiar, neutral principles of tort law—
would have completely defeated her claims.”).
196
See O’Moore v. Driscoll, 28 P.2d 438 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
194
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conduct exorcisms. Most Christians will see this church as a cult. NonChristians will be equally suspicious. Yet there is an argument for consent
here, or at least for a reasonable mistake about consent.197 Schubert knew
about the church’s beliefs about demons, and she participated in services
anyway. And Schubert freely returned to the church following the first
exorcism, after having several days to reflect on what happened. Legal
commentators are probably much more sensitive to these things than the
average jury. But most of them have simply assumed that there is no way
that anyone could ever have consented to this. 198 This backhanded exposes
a serious problem: The jury will not approach the issue of consent with an
open mind.
The best solution is not to dismiss the case outright, as the Texas
Supreme Court did. 199 But it also is not to do what the lower court did and
what the dissent in the Texas Supreme Court suggested. They really
believed that the case could be handled by keeping all evidence of religion
from the jury. This is, in fact, what the lower court did. The jury “heard
almost nothing about religion during the trial due to the trial court’s
diligent attempt to circumvent First Amendment problems and to honor the
court of appeals’ mandamus ruling that neither side introduce religion as a
reason for [Schubert’s] restraint.” 200 But anyone can see how this will be a
complete failure. Taking religion out of this case makes the church’s
actions inexplicable and even more offensive. They are now physically
pinning someone down for no reason at all. The church cannot defend itself
without talking about religion. But that brings us back into the religious
thicket.
These problems cannot be solved; they can only be managed. The best
answer lies in a jury determination about consent, coupled with substantial
197

Either would be enough to defeat liability. See Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of
Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1069 (2006) (describing “the well-accepted apparentconsent doctrine,” which says that “a defendant with a reasonable belief that plaintiff consents is
absolved of liability, even if plaintiff does not actually consent”).
198
See Thomas Clark, Exorcising Our Free Exercise Jurisprudence: A New Interpretation of Free
Exercise in Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 350, 366 (2009) (“In
this case there is no consent to be subjected to false imprisonment or assault at all.”); Cynthia Koploy,
Note, Free Exorcise Clause? Whether Exorcism Can Survive the Supreme Court’s “Smith Neutrality,”
104 NW. U. L. REV. 363, 369 (2010) (“The question presented to the Texas Supreme Court in Pleasant
Glade was whether religious actors could be held liable for conducting a religious exercise on a church
member when the exercise clearly satisfied the elements of a secular intentional tort.”).
199
See Pleasant Glade, 264 S.W.3d 1.
200
Id. at 18 (Jefferson, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). There has been a surprising amount of
support for this idea. See Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant
First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 48 (2010) (“The trial court was able to keep evidence about the
church’s beliefs about exorcism out of the trial, and the jury was free under tort law to conclude that
[Schubert] had consented to her church members’ conduct and find no liability.”); Koploy, supra note
198, at 382 (noting how “the trial court in Pleasant Glade kept the jury from hearing any religious
testimony at the direction of the appellate court”).
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judicial review of that determination. The Supreme Court has developed
principles for that review in the free speech context. Courts must carefully
separate culpable defendants from nonculpable ones. 201 Courts must
independently review the facts. 202 And they must decide the sufficiency of
those facts under a clear and convincing standard. 203 This is what should
happen in Pleasant Glade and in the other cases where similar torts are
alleged.
IV. CHURCH AUTONOMY AND ASSUMED LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
As we move from imposed legal obligations (such as tort) to assumed
legal obligations (such as contract and property), the context shifts.
Churches have no control over tort law or their obligations under it. But
churches do have control over their contracts and property arrangements.
The ministerial exception itself reflects this difference. Before HosannaTabor, courts agreed that ministers could not bring discrimination claims,
but they split on whether ministers could bring contract claims. 204 HosannaTabor mentions the issue, but stays away from it. 205
This Article proposes a quite different legal rule for assumed legal
obligations. Rules of contract and property enhance autonomy; they enable
churches to structure their affairs as they wish. In general, principles of
contract and property should apply to churches, as they do to other
organizations. But this creates two problems that must be explored. The
first lies in the difficulty of discerning what the church intended its legal
obligations to be; this will be called the “legal intent” problem. The second
lies in the difficulties that can arise from changed circumstances; this will
be called the “dead hand” problem.

201
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918–19 (1982) (explaining that “[t]he
First Amendment similarly restricts the ability of the State to impose liability on an individual solely
because of his association with another”).
202
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (“[I]n cases raising
First Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an
independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure that ‘the judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964))).
203
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285–86.
204
There are several cases suggesting that such claims should be permitted. E.g., Petruska v.
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 311 (3d Cir. 2006); Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985). For cases suggesting that such claims should be
barred, see infra note 207.
205
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012)
(“We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by
employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.”).
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A. Contract Cases and the Like
Again it is helpful to start where there is consensus. In the
employment discrimination context, courts universally dismiss
discrimination claims brought by clergy. 206 In the contract context, courts
universally dismiss cases brought by ministers under “just cause”
provisions of their contracts. 207 Courts will not decide whether a
congregation really had contractually sufficient reasons for firing the priest
or the rabbi. 208 Such cases involve the same pretext problem that surfaced
with the ministerial exception—juries charged with deciding the issue of
good cause will have to make decisions about what the minister’s religious
duties were and whether they were done right.209
In one sense, the contract claims are actually worse. In discrimination
cases, the law establishes proper and improper reasons for dismissal. Sex,
race, or being over forty are legally unjust causes; being an ex-offender,
under forty, or a Green Party member are not. 210 In contract cases, juries
decide not only why the church let the minister go, but also what types of
reasons are valid. Nothing here stops juries from simply overriding
religious judgments. A church might believe that a growing religious
school and a tight budget justify letting go of a mediocre minister with an
alcohol problem. A jury might find all of those same facts, but deem the
firing illegal. And, of course, contract claims pose the same classic problem
present in Hosanna-Tabor: Someone now has a right to lead a church
against the church’s demonstrated will.
A natural first reaction is to question why any special theory of
autonomy is necessary here. If churches want to avoid these just-cause
contract claims, they should simply avoid making promises of just-cause
employment. Contract law poses no inherent threat to church autonomy;
206

See supra Part I (discussing Hosanna-Tabor and the ministerial exception).
See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654, 655 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing a
rabbi’s claim that under the terms of the written contract, he could only be fired for “gross misconduct
or willful neglect of duty”); Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1013 (N.D.
Iowa 2007) (dismissing a rabbi’s claim that under the terms of the written contract because she could
only be fired for “gross misconduct or an ongoing inability to perform the duties described in the
agreement”); Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace Church in N.Y., No. 01-CV-7871
(KMW), 2004 WL 540327, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2004) (dismissing a minister’s claim that under
the terms of the written contract, she could only be fired “for cause”).
208
See, e.g., Friedlander, 347 F. App’x at 655 (“[R]eview of Friedlander’s claims in this case
would require scrutiny of whether she should have, inter alia, read more extensively from the Torah at
certain services, prepared students for their Bar or Bat Mitzvah more adequately, performed certain
pastoral services that were not performed, or followed the Temple’s funeral service policies . . . [and]
whether any failures rose to the level of ‘gross misconduct or willful neglect of duty . . . .’”).
209
See Lund, supra note 28, at 51–57 (labeling this the inquiry problem and unpacking it in more
detail).
210
See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (2012)) (age over forty); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title
VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)) (sex and race).
207
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churches just need to be careful when making commitments. 211 And surely
the vast majority of a church’s contracts will be enforced without regard to
religion. A church’s contracts with the property insurer or the gas company
get treated as ordinary contracts. Otherwise, churches might have a hard
time getting insurance or getting the heat turned on. The freedom to make
legally binding contracts is so essential that taking it away usually amounts
to oppression. Southern states, for example, took the right to contract away
from African Americans during slavery and after Reconstruction; 212 one
state is now trying to take it away from illegal immigrants.213 This is why
the Supreme Court, in the very first church autonomy case, prominently
stressed the rights of religious organizations to enter into contract and
property agreements. 214 And in some circumstances, it advances not only
liberty, but a specifically religious liberty: most will think of it as a good
thing that courts will enforce a Muslim husband’s promise to pay the sum
he promised in the Mahr agreement, and a Jewish husband’s promise to
divide the marital property according to the order of the Jewish beth din.215
1. The Legal Intent Problem.—What then explains the fierce
reluctance of courts to enforce contract claims that involve distinctively
religious obligations, such as the refusal of courts to adjudicate a dismissed
minister’s claim that he was fired without cause? This piece argues that it is
chiefly because of what it terms the legal intent problem. In many of these
cases, there is insufficient reason to think the parties intended or expected
the contract to give rise to legally enforceable rights.

211

Some courts have seized on this point. “[A]pplication of state contract law does not involve
government-imposed limits on [the defendant’s] right to select its ministers: Unlike the duties under
Title VII and state tort law, contractual obligations are entirely voluntary.” Petruska v. Gannon Univ.,
462 F.3d 294, 310 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“A church is always free to burden its activities
voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court.”).
212
See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a
Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 565 (2005) (“The inability of African-Americans to
avail themselves of the law, whether by entering into contracts or by obtaining redress for wrongs, was
among the hallmarks of slavery and the Black Codes.”).
213
See Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2011, Pub. Act No. 535,
§ 27 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-26(a) (2013)) (“No court of this state shall enforce the terms of, or
otherwise regard as valid, any contract between a party and an alien unlawfully present in the United
States . . . .”).
214
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 714 (1871) (“Religious organizations come before us
in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their
rights of property, or of contract, are equally protected under the protection of the law . . . .”).
215
See Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (upholding a decision dividing
marital property made by of a Jewish beth din); Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95, 98 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) (upholding an Islamic Mahr agreement dividing marital property because the parties
had agreed to it before marriage). See generally Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New
Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011).
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To understand this point, one must begin with how we regularly make
promises without any expectation that they will end up in court. You
promise your spouse to go to the grocery store; you promise the Associate
Dean to do a better job with faculty recruiting; you promise your travel
agent not to book online. You may intend to keep these promises. But they
are not promises that the law will necessarily enforce. It is not that these
promises are trivial or hastily made. No-fault divorce is the rule these days,
even though marital vows usually rank among the most important promises
of peoples’ lives. 216
Legal enforcement of promises, most think, should track peoples’
desires for legal enforcement. In a perfect world, courts would enforce a
promise if, and only if, the contracting parties would have wanted judicial
enforcement. 217 But our world is far from perfect. Parties often do not make
their intentions clear; sometimes they have different intentions. Even more
problematically, parties often have no intentions regarding enforcement—
they never think one way or the other about the prospect of litigation when
they make promises.
In such situations, everything turns on the default. In England, the
traditional default was non-enforcement—that is, promises were not
enforceable without some indication that the parties intended judicial
enforcement. 218 American law flips that presumption, generally assuming
that parties want legal enforcement of their promises unless they specify
otherwise. 219 This is where the problem lies, because it opens up the door to
contract claims. When one looks at the cases, one sees courts constantly

216
See Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. L. REV. 73,
119 (2011) (“[A]ll fifty states have adopted some version of no-fault divorce.”).
217
See Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 1022 (“In the ‘heaven of legal
concepts’ . . . actors would not simply ‘promise’: they would ‘enforceably-promise’ or ‘unenforceablypromise’ . . . promisees would rely accordingly, and contract law could be taught in one semester.”).
218
See Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (A.C.) 579 (U.K.) (refusing to enforce a promise
between a husband and wife because “the parties did not intend that [it] should be attended by legal
consequences”); Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1448–50 (2009) (discussing
the English rule).
219
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981) (“Neither real nor apparent intention
that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of
intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of a contract.”). This
somewhat overstates the matter. Other principles of contract law put limits on the kinds of promises
courts will enforce—perhaps most notably, the requirement of consideration. See id. §§ 17, 71–81
(discussing consideration). And there are some exceptions to the presumption of enforcement. See id.
§ 21, cmt. c (“In some situations the normal understanding is that no legal obligation arises, and some
unusual manifestation of intention is necessary to create a contract. Traditional examples are social
engagements and agreements within a family group.”); see also 1 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 2.13, at 190 (rev. ed. 1993) (“[I]f the subject matter and terms are not such as
customarily have affected legal relations, the transaction is not legally operative unless the expressions
of the parties indicate an intention to make it so.”).
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asked to intervene in religious disputes under the flimsiest of contractual
pretenses. 220
Perhaps the earliest and most well-known case involved a district
superintendent who allegedly told a pastor that, if the pastor kept working
at his current parish, he would eventually get “a congregation more suited
to his training and skills.” 221 The language was oral, nonspecific, and
completely off the cuff. It was not a promise; it was not even a statement of
fact—it was a statement about what the future might bring. It is the kind of
thing people are told all the time, but the court let his breach of contract
claim go forward. 222 In a more recent decision, one after Hosanna-Tabor, a
missionary had a written employment contract with his church that said he
was an at-will employee. The contract specifically mentioned the
ministerial exception as being applicable to him. 223 But the missionary
alleged that before he left the country, he was orally promised that he
would not be fired during the first three years unless there were “lifestyle
issues.” When he was let go, he brought suit and his case continues.224
First published in 1784, the Book of Discipline “sets forth the
theological grounding of The United Methodist Church.” 225 It lays out
procedures and substantive criteria for basically everything the Methodist
church does. 226 But plaintiffs regularly treat it as an 800-page-long
employment contract. The church’s hostility to racial and gender
discrimination becomes a legally binding promise not to discriminate; 227 its
detailed internal procedures for conducting dismissals, written in
unambiguously religious language, become legally binding promises that
the church must fulfill to the letter.228

220

See infra notes 221–42 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
See Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1359
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
222
Id. at 1361 (remanding for further proceedings).
223
See Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (M.D. Tenn. 2012)
(reciting contract language that the employee’s “relationship to the IMB will be that of an ‘at will’
employee” and moreover that “applicable First Amendment law [will also apply], including the
‘ministerial exception’”).
224
Id. at 1001–02 (dismissing the state law claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction and
sending the remainder of the case to state court).
225
THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, at v (2012).
226
Id. (“The Discipline [i]s the instrument for setting forth the laws, plan, polity, and process by
which United Methodists govern themselves . . . .” (emphasis added)).
227
See id. at ¶ 425 (“[A]ppointments are made without regard to race, ethnic origin, gender, color,
disability, marital status, or age, except for the provisions of mandatory retirement.”). This was litigated
as a contract claim in Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Church, 679 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004).
228
See Music v. United Methodist Church, 864 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Ky. 1993) (“Dr. Music claimed
that a contractual relationship had been established between the parties by virtue of the Book of
Discipline of the United Methodist Church (1988 edition), the ‘Employee Manual’ of the United
221
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If accepted, these claims would never end. One dismissed minister
claimed a contractual right to return to the pulpit because of an internal
working policy of the church stating, “Where employees are found to be
ineffective, counsel shall be given them . . . .” 229 Another sued claiming that
he had been fired in an improperly convened meeting and on an improperly
seconded motion. 230 These principles go beyond employment. One
disgruntled Baptist tried to essentially appeal a parliamentary ruling of the
Southern Baptist Convention into the federal courts. 231 He had tried
unsuccessfully to amend the slate of candidates that had been proposed,
and then asked the court to dismiss the current executive board of the
organization and order a new convention run under his interpretation of the
rules. An early Supreme Court case, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, made it clear that this is inappropriate—courts should not
inquire into whether churches follow their own procedures.232 But some
courts ignored Milivojevich. 233 Hosanna-Tabor reiterates the point, but it is
too soon to tell whether it will be consistently heeded. 234
Finally, there are the various quasi-contractual claims—alleged
violations of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 235 interference
with prospective advantage, 236 interference with contract,237 wrongful
Methodist Church. He further claimed that appellees violated the terms of his ‘employment contract’ by
failing to follow the procedures set forth in Paragraphs 2620–2625 of the Book of Discipline . . . .”).
229
Pierce v. Iowa-Mo. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 534 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1995).
There are other similar cases. See, e.g., Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 471
(8th Cir. 1993) (dismissing a claim over whether a nationwide church complied with its own bylaws
when it removed the plaintiff from its list of eligible ministers); Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 23
A.3d 1192, 1208 (Conn. 2011) (dismissing a claim that “the archdiocese’s own policies, procedures and
practices with respect to performance evaluations” should be read so as “to provide the plaintiff with an
opportunity to improve her job performance prior to terminating her employment or not renewing her
contract”); Callahan v. First Congregational Church of Haverhill, 808 N.E.2d 301, 311–12 (Mass. 2004)
(dismissing a similar procedural claim).
230
See Errgong-Weider v. United Congregational Church of Norwalk, No. FSTCV116009458S,
2011 WL 5842378, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2011).
231
See Crowder v. S. Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987).
232
426 U.S. 696, 724–25 (1976).
233
See, e.g., Errgong-Weider, 2011 WL 5842378, at *11 n.8 (“[A] party may seek judicial relief
based on a church’s failure to follow its own procedures” (quoting Alicea v. New Brunswick
Theological Seminary, 581 A.2d 900, 908 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), aff’d, 608 A.2d 218 (N.J.
1992))); Ervin v. Lilydale Progressive Missionary Baptist Church, 813 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (Ill. App. Ct.
2004) (“[T]he [F]irst and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments do not prohibit court intervention when the
church fails to follow the procedures it has, itself, enacted.”).
234
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“We thus held [in Milivojevich] that by inquiring into whether the
Church had followed its own procedures, the State Supreme Court had unconstitutionally undertaken
the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment
commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of the Church.”).
235
See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654 (2d Cir. 2009); Marshall v. Munro,
845 P.2d 424 (Ala. 1993); Celnik v. Congregation B’Nai Israel, 131 P.3d 102 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
236
See, e.g., Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 1997).
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discharge, 238 unfair termination, 239 and promissory estoppel. 240 These are
sometimes seen as contract claims, though they do not necessarily depend
on any actual promise. In a suit against a Catholic seminary, a disappointed
candidate claimed that his classmates, who he claimed were gay, had
sexually harassed him. The New Jersey Supreme Court gave him a trial on
his claim of an “implied contract”—his assertion that the seminary
somehow promised him that this would not happen without making any
specific promise at all.241
Where courts dismiss these claims, the opinions typically talk about
how deciding the contract claim would involve inherently religious issues
that courts are not fit to resolve. 242 This is certainly true; deciding whether
the rabbi had been fired for “good cause” would require courts to pass on
religious questions. But this is not the root of the problem. Imagine a rabbi
who will not sign his employment contract without a judicially enforceable
“good cause” clause in it. If courts refuse to enforce such clauses, the
temple and the rabbi will be at an impasse. They should be able to put
something in the contract, if they want, that authorizes the court to
adjudicate the matter. Many noted legal scholars disagree with this idea.
They claim that the immunity surrounding matters of internal church
governance is not waivable—that courts cannot get involved in these
religious disputes, no matter what the parties want.243 But this is unintuitive.
If they are sufficiently clear about it, religious groups should be able to
enlist the courts to help them resolve their disputes.
The best explanation then for why courts hesitate to enforce these
promises relates to expectations about legal enforcement. Parties simply do
237

See, e.g., Celnik v. Congregation B’Nai Israel, 131 P.3d 102 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
See, e.g., Kraft v. Rector, Churchwardens & Vestry of Grace Church in N.Y., No. 01-CV-7871
(KMW), 2004 WL 540327, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2004).
239
See, e.g., Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church of Washington, 553 S.E.2d 511 (Va. 2001).
240
See, e.g., Dayner v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 23 A.3d 1192 (Conn. 2011).
241
See McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J. 2002).
242
See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654, 655 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[R]eview of
Friedlander’s claims in this case would require scrutiny of whether she should have, inter alia, read
more extensively from the Torah at certain services, prepared students for their Bar or Bat Mitzvah
more adequately, performed certain pastoral services that were not performed, or followed the Temple’s
funeral service policies . . . [and] whether any failures rose to the level of ‘gross misconduct or willful
neglect of duty . . . .’”).
243
See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, J.)
(citation omitted) (“[T]he ministerial exception, like the rest of the internal-affairs doctrine, is not
subject to waiver or estoppel. A federal court will not allow itself to get dragged into a religious
controversy even if a religious organization wants it dragged in.”); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment
Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 58 n.236 (1998) (“[T]he
objection to judicial inquiry into religious doctrine cannot be waived.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 142,
at 1809 (“Religious entities thus possess a degree of autonomy over the resolution of internal disputes
unlike any other known to the law, and this autonomy may not be surrendered by contract or other act
of consent to state power.”).
238
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not intend the “good cause” provision in the rabbi’s contract to be
enforceable in a court of law. Churches mean to decide for themselves
whether the minister was fit or unfit. That is one of their most core
religious functions. It would be astonishing if they meant to turn that role
over to some court. The religious questions inherent in these cases are not
the problem; they are a symptom of the problem. The problem is that these
promises were never intended to be judicially enforceable.
To handle this, we need a robust doctrine of waiver. Churches should
be allowed to waive their right of self-governance. 244 But waivers must be
intentional, 245 they must be clear and unambiguous, 246 and there must be a
strong presumption against waiver generally. 247 If a church and a minister
want judicial enforcement of the “good cause” clause in a minister’s
contract, they must say so explicitly. Perhaps some more general provisions
in a contract could suggest waiver—a choice-of-law clause, a choice-offorum clause, or a liquidated damages clause. But even these should not be
enough. Those clauses would only indicate that a lawyer drafted the
employment contract. Absent some explicit mention of judicial resolution,
contract claims should not go forward. 248
2. The Dead Hand Problem.—The second problem with enforcing
religious contracts is quite different from the first, and it comes up much
less frequently. The dead hand problem arises from the intertemporal
nature of contracts. Contracts create obligations today that the parties will
be legally bound to perform in the future, sometimes the far distant future.
In the context of religious obligations, this can create knotty problems.
Religious arbitration provides a good example. Two Jews marry, and agree
that in the event of a divorce, a beth din (a Jewish religious court) will
resolve all legal issues between them. Years later, one of the spouses leaves
the faith. Years after that, they divorce. Maybe the initial agreement should
be enforced, even after all these years, even though one party left the faith
long ago. But there is something troubling about this. 249
244
See Douglas Laycock & Susan E. Waelbroeck, Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1471–73 (1988).
245
See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682
(1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The classic description of an effective waiver of a
constitutional right is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”).
246
See United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (“Waivers . . . to be effective, must be unequivocally expressed.”).
247
See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 595 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (“[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.”).
248
Maybe there is one example. See Menorah Chapels v. Needle, 899 A.2d 316, 321 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2006) (“The contract for funeral services executed in this case provided that: ‘All disputes
involving this agreement shall be resolved in accordance with New Jersey law and may be heard in the
Superior Court, Law Division . . . .’ Consent to resolution of this matter by a civil court thus exists.”).
249
Some have concluded that the enforcement of such a prenuptial agreement is simply
unconstitutional. See Paul Finkelman, A Bad Marriage: Jewish Divorce and the First Amendment,
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Admittedly, this problem is more hypothetical than real, but it comes
up. Consider a case like Zummo v. Zummo, 250 where a marrying couple
agrees in a prenuptial agreement to raise their children Jewish. After the
wedding, they have three children and then divorce ten years later. After
the divorce, the father becomes Catholic and seeks to take his children to
Catholic services. A lower court in Pennsylvania forbade him, citing the
prenuptial agreement. But the appellate court reversed. Much of the
appellate opinion focuses on the difficulties of defining Judaism. 251 But the
deeper problem is that of the dead hand. Religious liberty includes a right
to convert—a right to change one’s mind about religious matters. 252 The
father’s 1978 promise to be Jewish and raise his kids as Jews now prevents
him in 1991 from being Roman Catholic and raising his kids as Roman
Catholics.
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 253 the Supreme Court addressed this
issue in the context of free speech. Cohen involved a reporter sued for
breaking a promise of confidentiality made to a source. The Court rejected
the reporter’s First Amendment defense, reasoning that the reporter had a
constitutional right to report the name of his sources, but that he gave that
up when he promised confidentiality. Cohen is somewhat controversial; it
was a 5–4 decision. 254 But the Court’s conclusion makes sense in light of
free speech doctrine. Enforcing promises is a content-neutral restriction on
speech, and the Court has interpreted the Free Speech Clause to generally
allow content-neutral restrictions on speech. 255 But Cohen’s premise is not
a universal one. 256 And some religious contracts cases may indeed present
dead hand problems so serious that courts should refuse to enforce the

2 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 131, 152 (1995) (“It seems clear, however, that to compel a non-Jew to
appear before a Jewish religious court [in this kind of circumstance], violates the First Amendment.”).
250
574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
251
Id. at 1146 (“The father is prohibited from taking his children to ‘religious services contrary to
the Jewish’ faith. What constitutes a ‘religious service?’ Which are ‘contrary’ to the Jewish faith? What
for the matter is the ‘Jewish’ faith? Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionist, Messianic,
Humanistic, Secular and other Jewish sects might differ widely on this point.”).
252
See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987) (“The
First Amendment protects the free exercise rights of [people] who . . . convert from one faith to
another . . . .”).
253
501 U.S. 663 (1991).
254
For strong criticism of Cohen, see Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the
Cohen Maledicta that Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135
(1997).
255
The Court stressed the general applicability of the law in question. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669–
72.
256
One cannot, for example, bargain away one’s constitutional right not to be enslaved. See
Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete
Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 430 (2006). And lower
courts have held that women cannot bargain away their right to an abortion. See In re Baby M, 525
A.2d 1128, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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promises in question. Perhaps Zummo is such a case, perhaps not. But in
any event, it is not possible to draw a precise line here. Courts will have to
simply address these issues as they arise, case by case.
B. Property Cases and the Like
Property law, like contract law, relies on private ordering. So property
cases involve the same kinds of issues and tensions as the contracts cases.
But here the Supreme Court has been active in articulating a constitutional
framework. In a sense, this final Part brings us full circle; we return now to
the property case that gave rise to the church autonomy principles in the
first place.
All of the early Supreme Court cases about church autonomy arose out
of church schisms, where different factions of the church would claim
ownership of the church’s real property. 257 The rules of law took a long
time to settle. They also moved from being common law principles to
constitutional ones.258 Even now, not everything is clear. As it stands, there
are two methods approved by the Supreme Court for states to adopt when
handling disputes over church property. The first is the organizational
approach of Watson v. Jones, 259 in which a court resolves property disputes
by looking to the organizational structure of the church. In a hierarchical
church, Watson gives the property to the hierarchy; in a congregational
church, Watson generally gives the property to the majority of the
congregation. The second is the neutral principles approach of Jones v.
Wolf, 260 under which courts use neutral principles of law to try and resolve
religious disputes over property the same way as nonreligious disputes.
1. The Legal Intent Problem.—These two approaches can seem far
apart. They can lead to different results in particular cases, which makes
the choice between them important. On the other hand, they actually agree
on the most fundamental principle. Courts do not independently decide, as
some abstract matter, which of the parties is more deserving of the property
in dispute. Instead the goal is for courts to discern the previously existing
intentions of the parties. Before the dispute arose, the church might have
had some understanding about where the property would go in the case of a
schism. The goal of courts, everyone agrees, should be to recover and
honor that understanding. 261 The recurring problem in these cases, of
257
See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am., 363 U.S.
190 (1960); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S.
94 (1952); Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1 (1918); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131
(1872); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
258
See Lund, supra note 28, at 13–20 (tracing this development).
259
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
260
443 U.S. 595 (1979).
261
See id. at 614 (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing the role of courts as being to “give effect in all
cases to the decisions of the church government agreed upon by the members before the dispute arose”).
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course, is that this understanding is difficult to discern; maybe it never
existed at all. This is another variation of the legal intent problem. Both
Watson v. Jones and Jones v. Wolf try to implement the church’s
preexisting legal intentions, but discerning those intentions runs into both
practical and conceptual problems.
The choice between Watson v. Jones and Jones v. Wolf is difficult.
Neither will get every case right—the question is which is better on
average. All told, I think Watson provides the better proxy for the original
intentions of the parties. Watson may not be perfect, 262 but there have been
some real disasters with Jones v. Wolf. Courts have awarded property to
schismatic congregations breaking away from hierarchical churches in
situations where it is hard to believe that is what anyone believed would
happen ex ante. 263 Students often have a hard time understanding what
could possibly be wrong with Jones v. Wolf. The fear is simply that there
may be a sizeable class of church property disputes where the original
understanding was that the national church would get the property in the
case of the split, but that arrangement was never reduced to any kind of
secular legal writing. And this is especially plausible when one realizes
how Watson v. Jones exacerbates such a tendency. By holding that such
writings were legally unnecessary, Watson encouraged churches to
abandon them. Watson thus coaxed hierarchical churches into avoiding the
very legal formalities that Jones v. Wolf then faulted them for not having.
Of course, Jones v. Wolf is not incompatible with hierarchical
churches. It requires only that hierarchical churches redraft their property
arrangements to make clear where they want the property to go to in the
case of a schism. 264 But this is so much more difficult than Jones v. Wolf
makes it seem. 265 Shortly after Jones v. Wolf, for example, the national
Episcopal Church passed the Dennis Canon, which purported to create a
trust in favor of the national church on all property held by any
congregation. 266 Local congregations were represented in the national
church process, but they did not individually agree to the Dennis Canon. So
262
For an example, see the analysis in Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Meena, 19 A.3d 1191 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (treating the Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America as a hierarchical church, and giving the property to the national church under
Watson v. Jones).
263
See Patrick J. Schiltz & Douglas Laycock, Employment in Religious Organizations, in
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 527 (James A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006).
264
See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 606 (“At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they
so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property.”).
265
Jones v. Wolf makes it seem easy. See id. at 606 (noting that the parties “can modify the deeds
or the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church” or that
“[a]lternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of
the denominational church,” and concluding that “[t]he burden involved in taking such steps will be
minimal”).
266
See Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of Episcopal
Diocese of Ga., Inc., 718 S.E.2d 237, 251–53 (Ga. 2011) (discussing the Dennis Canon).
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when they now secede from the national church, they make the powerful
argument that the Dennis Canon does not apply—because, after all, they
never specifically agreed to it.267 Local congregations see the Dennis Canon
as an attempt by the national church to steal their property. But maybe the
blame rests with Jones v. Wolf. If the expectation before Jones v. Wolf was
that the national church owned the property, then Jones v. Wolf changed the
game on the national churches. Jones v. Wolf stole their property, so to
speak, and the national churches cannot be faulted for trying to steal it
back.
This is not the place to engage a full-fledged debate over the relative
merits of Watson v. Jones and Jones v. Wolf. The point is that this whole
debate is another manifestation of the same legal intent problem that
surfaced in the contract cases. 268 All agree that churches should be able to
privately order their affairs as they wish, but problems arise because the
parties’ intent is so persistently difficult to discern in hindsight. But the
conclusion here is the same as in the contract section—for the same reasons
that courts hesitate to enforce certain contractual promises, they should be
suspicious of the neutral principles logic of Jones v. Wolf.
2. The Dead Hand Problem.—Watson v. Jones and Jones v. Wolf
deal with how to best discern the will of the church. The Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull case, mentioned earlier, deals with the problem of the dead
hand. 269 Mary Elizabeth involved the old English departure-from-doctrine
rule. Under that rule, when a church splintered into factions, courts would
give the church’s property to the faction whose beliefs more closely
resembled the beliefs of the original church. This, the rule presumed, is
what the original donor of the property would have wanted. One problem
was that courts would have to make theological judgments about the beliefs
of the various factions. 270 But the rule also posed a classic dead hand
problem: why should the original donor get perpetual control over the
property long after his death? And in practice, the departure-from-doctrine
rule had a paralyzing theological effect; any change in church doctrine

267

See, e.g., id. at 257 (Brown, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he Dennis Canon . . . is inconsistent
with Georgia laws in many ways since it allows the National Church to create a trust without owning
the trust property and without any deed . . . [and with] no expressed intent of [the local church] to
transfer its property”). This position has triumphed in some cases. See, e.g., All Saints Parish
Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of S.C., 685 S.E.2d 163, 174 (S.C. 2009) (“[W]e
hold that neither the 2000 Notice nor the Dennis Canon has any legal effect on title to the All Saints
congregation’s property.”); Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., No. 11-0332, 2013 WL 4608632, at *17
(Tex. Aug. 30, 2013) (concluding that, even if the Dennis Canon had legal effect, the Canon creates
only a revocable trust—a trust revocable at the will of the congregation in question).
268
See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the legal intent problem in the context of contract cases).
269
See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (discussing Mary Elizabeth).
270
See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 450 (1969).
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created the possibility of a dissenter bringing suit to take control of the
property.
In Mary Elizabeth, the Supreme Court unanimously held the
departure-from-doctrine rule unconstitutional, so the dead hand issue rarely
arises now in the context of church property. But the same issue has come
up, strangely enough, in the context of individuals and their property.
Generally speaking, individuals can create trusts for any number of
purposes, including religious ones. 271 But the Restatement of Trusts makes
a strange but significant exception to this general principle:
But the use of private trusts that create financial pressure regarding the future
religious choices of beneficiaries is a different matter. A trust provision is
ordinarily invalid if its enforcement would tend to restrain the religious
freedom of the beneficiary by offering a financial inducement to embrace or
reject a particular faith or set of beliefs concerning religion. 272

The old cases—happily rare nowadays—involved children losing their
inheritances if they departed from their parents’ religions. 273 The
Restatement takes the firm position that such trusts cannot be enforced.274
This again is a concern about the dead hand. The authors of the
Restatement of Trusts do not cite (and maybe do not even know about) the
church autonomy cases. There is no mention of Watson or Mary Elizabeth.
But that is what is really happening. Courts are making exceptions to the
usual law of trusts to protect beneficiaries from the religious influence of
the dead hand. 275
271
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 29 cmt. k (2003) (“Individuals are normally free
during life to promote their theological views among others, and to create charitable trusts during life or
at death to support or advance a chosen religion.”).
272
See id.
273
See e.g., U. S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 862 (Or. 1954) (involving a
will that allowed the testator’s daughter to inherit when she turned thirty-two, on the condition that she
could prove “that she has not embraced, nor become a member of, the Catholic faith nor ever married to
a man of such faith”); In re Jamieson’s Estate, 55 Pa. D. & C. 435, 436 (Pa. Orphans’ Ct. 1946) (“I
hereby direct that if any of my daughters or their issue at the time of my decease be members of the
Roman Catholic Church or shall thereafter join the Roman Catholic Church, the legacy or legacies
hereby given to such daughter, child or children or issue . . . shall lapse . . . .”).
274
The decided cases are more split. Some courts have struck down such trusts. See In re Devlin’s
Trust Estate, 130 A. 238, 239 (Pa. 1925) (striking down a provision that provided the legacy with
income “only so long as he is brought up and reared in the Roman Catholic faith”); Drace v. Klinedinst,
118 A. 907, 908 (Pa. 1922) (striking down a provision that required the legacies to remain “faithful to
[the testator’s] religion”). Some courts have upheld them. See Lockwood v. Killian, 375 A.2d 998, 1000
(Conn. 1977) (upholding the religious requirement in a scholarship program for “needy, deserving
boys . . . who are members of the Caucasian race and who have . . . specifically professed themselves to
be of the Protestant Congregational Faith,” while simultaneously striking out the racial and gender
requirements).
275
For a modern example, consider In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009), which
involved a provision in a will that treated the testator’s grandchildren as deceased if they had married
outside of the Jewish faith. The state appellate court struck the provision as violating public policy. See
In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). But the Illinois Supreme Court upheld it,
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CONCLUSION
More than twenty years ago, in Employment Division v. Smith, the
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle religious
observers to be exempt from generally applicable laws. 276 Lower courts
apply this principle faithfully in the context of suits between the
government and religious believers. But in the context of suits between
religious believers themselves, courts sometimes ignore Smith. They try to
work out for themselves what the rules should be. And although the cases
are not completely consistent, they do reveal strange patterns—as if for
some reason, judges hearing these cases are all subconsciously drawn to the
same basic underlying principles, even in cases with radically different
factual postures.
This Article has tried to discover those basic principles, and has
offered a unifying theory that seeks to explain them in their totality. For
assumed legal obligations, like those of contract and property, churches
should generally be treated like other organizations; private ordering must
be allowed to do its job. But courts must pay attention to the legal intent
and dead hand problems that this Article discusses. For imposed legal
obligations (like tort or employment discrimination), courts should be quite
hesitant about allowing insiders to bring suits challenging religious beliefs
and practices.
Dissenting in a case seventy years ago, Justice Jackson remarked that
“[r]eligious activities which concern only members of the faith are and
ought to be free—as nearly absolutely free as anything can be.” 277 Despite
the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, lower
courts have embraced this idea when deciding religious disputes between
private parties. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor
confirms it. But what it means, and how it applies, will be an issue for all of
us in the years to come.

stressing that the will’s conditions had to be satisfied at the time of the testator’s death, and that there
was therefore no future religious or marital pressure on beneficiaries. See Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d at 903
(noting that the condition “operated on the date of her death to determine which, if any, of the
grandchildren qualified for distribution on that date” and thus “[t]here was nothing any of the
grandchildren could have done at that time to make themselves eligible or ineligible for the
distribution”).
276
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
277
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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